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§ 38-9a-102. Definitions. Utah Statutes
Title 3 8. Liens
Chapter 9a. Wrongful Lien Injunctions

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 38-9a-102. Definitions

As used in this chapter, "wrongful lien" refers to a lien made in violation
of Section 76-6-503.5, and includes :
( 1 ) a wrongful lien as defined in Section 3 8-9-102; and
(2)

anonconsensual common law document as defined inSection 38-9102.
~

Cite as Utah Code §38-9a-102
History. Amended by Chapter 114, 2014 General Session,§ 14, eff.
5/13/2014. Enacted by Chapter 93, 2005 General Session
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§ 38-9-102. [Renumbered from 38-9-1] Definitions.
Utah Statutes Title 38. Liens
Chapter 9. Wrongful Lien Act

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§38-9-102. [Renumbered from 38-9-1) Definitions

As used in this chapter:
(1)
(a)

"Affected person" means:
a person who is a record interest holder of the real property

that is the subject of a recorded nonconsensual common law document; or
(b)

the person against whom a recorded nonconsensual

common law document purports to reflect or establish a claim or obligation.
(2)

"Document sponsor" means a person who, personally or

through a designee, signs or submits for recording a document that is, or is
alleged to be, a nonconsensual common law document.

(3)
"Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner,
title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner.
(4)

"Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real

property who offers a document for recording or filing with any county

N

Q)

recorder in the state asserting a lien, or notice ofinterest, or other claim of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest in certain real property.
(5) "Nonconsensual common law document" means adocumentthat is
submitted to a county recorder's office for recording against public official
property that:

~

(a) purports to create a lien or encumbrance on or a notice of interest in the
~

real property;
(b) at the time the document is recorded, is not:
(i)

expressly author ized by this chapter or a state or federal statute;
~

(ii) authorized by or contained inan order orjudgment of a court of

competent jurisdiction; or

(iii) signed by or expressly authorized by a document signed by the owner
of the real property; and

~

(c) is submitted in relation to the public official's status or capacity as a
public official.

(6) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest inreal
property.
(7) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, town, school district,
special improvement or taxing district, local district, special service
district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
~

(8) "Public official" means:
(a) a current or former:
(i)

member of the Legislature;
M

(ii) member of Congress;

i

cu

0..
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(iii) judge;
(iv) memberoflawenforcement;
(j

(v) corrections officer;
(vi) active member of the Utah State Bar; or

(vii) member of the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(b) an individual currently or previously appointed or elected to an elected
position in:
(i)

the executive branch of state or federal government;
or

(ii) a political subdivision;

(c) an individual currently or previously appointed to or employed in a

position ina political subdivision, or state or federal government that:
(i)

is a policymaking position; or

(ii) involves:
(A)

purchasing or contracting decisions;

(B)

drafting legislation or making rules;

(C)

determining rates or fees; or

(D)

making adjudicative decisions; or

(d) an immediate family member of a person described in
Subsections (8)(a)through(c).

~
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(9)

"Public official property" means real property that has at least one
record interest holder who is a public official.

(10) (a)

"Record interest holder" means a person who holds or

possesses a present, lawful property interest in real property,
including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or
beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real
property appears in the county recorder's records for the county

in which the property is located.
(b)

"Record interest holder" includes any grantor in the

chain ofthe title in real property.

(11) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership
interest in certain real property is recorded or filed inthe county
recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(12) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a
lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in
certain real property and at the time it is recorded is not:

(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or
federal statute;
{b)

authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or

(b) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by
the owner of the real property.
Cite as Utah Code§ 38-9-102 History. Renumbered from§ 38-9-1
and amended by Chapter 114, 2014 General Session, §2, eff. 5/13/2014.
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§38-9a-203. Hearing - Court action. Utah Statutes
Title 3 8. Liens
Chapter 9a. Wrongful Lien Injunctions

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§38-9a-203. Hearing - Court action
(1)

(a) A hearing requested by the respondent as allowed under
Section 38-9a-202 shall be held within 10 days from the date
the request is filed with the court, except as provided under
Subsection (3).
(b) Ifthe court finds compelling reasons to continue the hearing
date, the hearing shall then be held at the earliest possible
time.

(2)

At the hearing the court may modify, revoke, or continue the
injunction.. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has made,
uttered, recorded, or filed a wrongful lien against the petitioner or the
petitioner's property.

(3)

(a) Ifthe respondent requests a hearing subsequent to the ten-day
period after service, the court shall set a hearing within a
reasonabletimefrom the date requested.
(b) At the hearing, the burden ison the respondent to show good
cause why the civil wrongful lien injunction should be
nullified.
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§3 8-9a-205. Remedies-Actions arising from injunctions-Attorney fees.
Utah Statutes

Title 38. Liens
Chapter 9a. Wrongful Lien Injunctions

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§38-9a-205. Remedies - Actions arising from injunctions Attorney fees
(1)

The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement ofthe orders
ofthe court are in addition to any other civil and criminal remedies
available.

(2)

The district court shall hear and decide all matters arising pursuant to
this chapter.

(3)

After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter
an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including
reasonable attorney's fees.

~

Cite as Utah Code §38-9a-205
History. Enacted by Chapter 93, 2005 General Session.
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§ 57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite
defects.
Utah Statutes
Title 57. Real Estate
Chapter 4a. Effects of Recording

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special
Session

LfJ)

§57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of
contents despite defects
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in its
execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified
copy of a recorded document is admissible as evidence to
the same extent the original document would be
admissible as evidence.
Cite as Utah Code§ 57-4a-2
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§57-3-102. Record imparts notice- Change ininterestrateValidity of document- Notice of unnamed interests Conveyance by grantee.
Utah Statutes
Title 57 .Real Estate
Chapter 3. Recording of Documents

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
~

§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice - Change in interest rate Validity of document- Notice of unnamed interests - Conveyance
by grantee
(1)

Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the
manner prescribed by this title, each original document or certified
copy of a document complying with Section 57-4a- 3, whether or
not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying
with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with
Section 70A-9a-502,whether or not acknowledged shall, from the
time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart
notice to all persons of their contents.

(2)

If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the
~

interest rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining
to the underlying secured obligation does not affect the notice or
alter the priority of the document provided under Subsection (1 ).
(3)

This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect
to the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice

C'<U
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of the document.
(4)

The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal
consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise
purports to be in trust without

(5)

naming beneficiaries or stating the terms ofthe trust does not
charge any third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or
ofthe interest of any other person not named in the document.

~

(6)

The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest
granted to him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the
document in which he appears as grantee or in any other document
recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real
property subject to the interest.

Cite as Utah Code §57-3-102
History. Amended by Chapter 252, 2000 General Session.

~
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§76-6-503.5. Wrongful liens and fraudulent handling of
recordable writings -Penalties.
Utah Statutes
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 76-6-503.5. Wrongful liens and fraudulent handling

of recordable writings -Penalties
(1)

"Lien" means:
(a)

an instrument or document filed pursuant to Section 70A-9a5l6 ·

'

(b)

anonconsensual common law document as defined in Section
38-9-102;

{c)

a wrongful lien as defined in Section 3 8-9-102; or

{d)

any instrument or document that creates or purports to

~

create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or
personal property or a claim on another's assets.
(2)

A person is guilty ofthe crime ofwrongful lien ifthat person
knowingly makes, utters, records, or files a lien:
(a)

having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he has a
present and lawful property interest in the property or a claim
on the assets; or

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(b)

ifthe person files the lien in violation of a civil wrongful lien
injunction pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 9a, Wrongful Lien
Injunctions.

(3)

A violation of this section is a third degree felony unless the person

has been previously convicted of an offense under this section, in
which case the violation is a second degree felony.
(4)

(a) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone
falsifies, destroys, removes, records, or conceals any will,
deed, mortgage, security instrument, lien, or other writing for
which the law provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent
handling of recordable writings.

{;j

(b) A violation of Subsection ( 4)(a) isa third degree felony unless
the person has been previously convicted of an offense under
this section, in which case the violation is a second degree
felony.

~

(5)

This section does not prohibit prosecution for any act in violation of
Section 76-8-414 or for
any offense greater than an offense under this
section.

Cite as Utah Code §76-6-503.5
(i

History. Amended by Chapter 114,2014 General
Session ,§15, eff. 5/13/2014. Enacted by Chapter 93,
2005 General Session
N

~

~

res
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§78B-2-102. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Utah Statutes
Title 78B .Judicial Code
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations
Current through Chapter 2:, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-2-102. Time for commencement of actions
generally

Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in
this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific
cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
Cite as Utah Code § 78B 2-102
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008
General Session.
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§ 78B-2-305. Within three years.
Utah Statutes
Title 78B.Judicial Code
Chapter 2.Statutes ofLimitations
@

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-2-305. Within three years

(:@

An action may be brought within three years:
(1)

for waste, trespass upon, or injwy to real property; except that
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground
works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not

~

accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the waste or trespass;
(@

(2)

for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including
actions for specific recovery; except that in cases where the
subject ofthe action isa domestic animal usually included inthe
term "livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded

@)

mark or brand, ifthe animal strayed or was stolen from the true
owner without the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until
the owner has actual knowledge offacts that would put a

(@)
.

reasonable person upon inquiry as to the possession ofthe
animal by the defendant;
~

(3)

for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the

~

M

Q.)

cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake;
(4)

for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the
statutes ofthis state; or

(5)

i)

to enforce liability imposed by Section 78B-3-603, or for
damages under Section 78B-6- 1701, except that the cause of
action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or
reasonably should know of the harm suffered.

Cite as Utah Code §78B-2-305
History. Amended by Chapter 143, 2010 General Session.
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§78B-2-210. Adverse possession - Under written instrument or
judgment. Utah Statutes

Title 78B.Judicial Code
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session

§78B-2-210. Adverse possession - Under written instrument or
judgment
(1)

Property is considered to have been adversely held ifa person in
possession of the property, either personally or through another:

~

(2)
@

(a)

possesses a written document purporting to convey title; or

(b)

possesses a decree or judgment from a court of
competent jurisdiction conveying title; and

(c)

has occupied the property continuously for at least seven
years.

If the property consists of a tract divided into
lots, the possession of one lot is not
considered a possession ofany other lot in the
same tract.

Cite as Utah Code § 78B-2-210
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session.
\0
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§ 78B-2-211. What constitutes adverse possession under written

instrument.

Utah Statutes

Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-2-211. What constitutes adverse possession under written
instrument
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person
claiming a title based upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree,
the property is considered to have been possessed if:
(1)

it has been usually cultivated or improved;

(2)

it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;

(3)

although not enclosed, ithas been used for the supply offuel,
fencing timber, for the purpose ofhusbandry, or for pasturage or
for the ordinary use ofthe occupant; or

(4)

where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of the farm or lot which may have been left not cleared or
not inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the
adjoining county is considered to have been occupied for the same
length of time as the part improved and cultivated.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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§ 78B-2-214. Adverse possession - Continuous - Seven years Taxes paid.

Utah Statutes
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations
Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-2-214. Adverse possession - Continuous - Seven years -

Taxes paid
Adverse possession may not be established unless it is shown that the
land has been occupied and claimed continuously for seven years, and
that the party and the party's predecessors and grantors have paid all
taxes which_ have been levied and assessed upon the land according to
law.

Cite as Utah Code§ 78B-2-214
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session.
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§ 78B-2-225. Actions related to

improvements in real property.
Utah Statutes
Title78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations
Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth
Special Session
§ 78B-2-225. Actions related to improvements in

real property
(1)

As used in this section:
(a)

"Abandonment" means that there has been no design or
construction activity on the improvement for a continuous
period of one year.

(b)

"Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or
administrative relieffor acts, errors, omissions, or breach
of duty arising out of or related to the design,
construction, or installation ofan improvement, whether
based intort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity,
contribution, or other source oflaw.

(c)

"Completion of improvement" means the date of
substantial completion of an improvement to real property
as established by the earliest of:
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(d)

(Q

a Certificate of Substantial Completion;

(ii)

a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing
agency;or

(iii)

the date of first use or possession of the improvement.

"Improvement" means any building, structure,
infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made
change, addition, modification, or alteration to real
property.

(e)

"Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability
company, partnership, joint venture, association,
proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity.

(;j

(f)

"Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or
performing studies, plans, specifications, drawings,
designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates,
surveys, staking, construction, and the review,
observation, administration, management, supervision,
inspections, and tests of construction for or in relation to an
improvement.

(2)

The Legislature finds that:
(a)

exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors,
omissions, or breach of duty after the possibility of injury
or damage has become highly remote and
unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the
citizens of the state:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0
N

~

m

Cl-.

~

~

(b

these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records
undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider
improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many
completion of an improvement;

(c)

these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;

(d

the possibility of i11iury and damage becomes highly remote and
years following completion or abandonment; and

(e)

(a)

~

except as provided in Subsection (7), it is inthe best interests ofthe
state to impose the periods oflimitation and repose provided in this
all causes of action by or against a provider arising out of or related to
the design, construction, or installation of an improvement.

(3)

~

An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the
abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty
a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within

~

40J

period.
(b

All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced
from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date
a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
cause of action is discovered or discoverable before completion of
improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period
upon completion or abandonment.

(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3 )(b), an action may not be commenced
against a provider more than nine years after completion of the
improvement or abandonment of
construction. Inthe event the cause of action is discovered or
discoverable in the eighth or ninth year ofthe nine-year period, the
injured person shall have two additional years from that date to
commence an action.
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(5)

Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:
(a)

who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or
breach of duty, or the injury, damage, or other loss caused by
his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or

(b)

for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of
duty.

(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence
the action within the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and
(4) solely because that person was a mmor or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have
two years from the date the disability is removed to commence
the action.
~

(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or
bodily injury to an individual while engaged in the design,
installation, or construction of an improvement.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any
action against any person in actual possession or control of the
improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately
causes the injury for which the action is brought.
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose
otherwise prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable contract.
( 1 0) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of
action.
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( 11 ) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May
3, 2003, notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or
abandoned before May 3, 2004.

Cite as Utah Code §786-2-225
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session.

§786-2-226. Boundary surveys.
Utah Statutes

Title 78B.JudicialCode
Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§78B-2-226. Boundary surveys
An action against a surveyor for acts, errors, or omissions in the
performance of a boundary survey filed pursuant to Section 17-23-17
shall be brought within five years of the date of the filing.
Cite as Utah Code §78B-2-226
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session.
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§789-5-825.Attomey fees - Award where action or defense in bad
faith - Exceptions.
Utah Statutes
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-5-825. Attorney fees - Award where action or defense in bad

faith - Exceptions
(1)

In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).

(2)

The court, initsdiscretion, may award no fees or limited fees
against a party under Subsection (1), but only ifthe court:
(a)

finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the
action before the court; or

(b)

the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding
fees under the provisions of Subsection (1 ).

~

Cite as Utah Code §78B-5-825
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session.

~
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§ 78B-6-13 03. Lis pendens - Notice. Utah Statutes

Title 78B.JudicialCode

Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings
Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-6-1303. Lis pendens-Notice
(1)

(a) Any party to an action filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, or a Utah district
court that affects the title to, or the right of possession of,
~

real property may file a notice of pendency of action.
(b)

A party that chooses to file a notice of pendency of action
shall:
(0

first, file the notice with the court that has jurisdiction
of the action; and

Oi)

second, record a copy of the notice filed with the
court with the county recorder in the county where
the property or any portion ofthe property is located.

(c)

A person may not file a notice of pendency of action
unless a case has been filed and is pending in a United
States or Utah district court.
1.f)
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(2)

The notice shall contain:
(a)

the caption of the case, with the names of the parties and
the case number;

(b)

the object of the action or defense; and

(c)

the specific legal description of only the property affected .

~

(3)

From the time of filing the notice, a purchaser , an
encumbrancer of the property, or any other party ininterestthat
may be affected by the action is considered to have constructive
notice of pendency ofaction.

Cite as Utah Code §78B-6-1303
History. Amended by Chapter 306,2016 General Session, §1,eff.
5/10/2016. Enacted by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
~

~
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§ 78B-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of
pendency of an action.

Utah Statutes
iJ

Title78B. Judicial Code
Chapter6. Particular Proceedings

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
~

§78B-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of pendency of an action
(1)

Any time after a notice has been filed pursuant to Section 78B-6-

1303, any of the following may make a motion to the court in which
the action is pending to release the notice:
(a) a party to the action; or

(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the

t,;;

~

notice, including a prospective purchaser with an executed
purchase contract.
(2) A court shall order notice of pendency of action released if:
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (1);
and

(b) after a notice and hearing if determined to be necessary by
the court, the court finds that the claimant has not established

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the real
property claim that is the subject of the notice.
(3)
Ci)

In deciding a motion under Subsection (2), ifthe underlying action
for which a notice of pendency of action is filed is an action for
specific performance, a court shall order a notice released if:
(a) the court finds that the party filing the action has failed to

~

satisfy the statute of frauds for the transaction under which the
claim is asserted relating to the real property; or
(b) the court finds that the elements necessary to require specific

performance have not been established by a preponderance of

@

the evidence.
(4)
~

Ifa court releases a claimant's notice pursuant to this section, that
claimant may not record another notice with respect to the same
property without an order from the court in which the action is
pending that authorizes the recording of a new notice ofpendency.

@
'

(5)

Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property
that is the subject of a notice of pendency, a court may, at anytime
after the notice has been recorded, require, as a condition of
maintaining the notice, that the claimant provide security to the

~

moving party in the amount and form directed by the court,
regardless of whether the court has received an application to
release under Subsection ( 1).
@

(6)

A person who receives security under Subsection (5) may recover
from the surety an amount not to exceed the amount of the security

d,

upon a showing that:

(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and
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(b) the person receiving the security suffered damages as a result
of the maintenance of the notice.
(7)

The amount of security required by the court under Subsection (5)
does not establish or limitthe amount ofdamages or reasonable
attorney fees and costs that may be awarded to a party who is found
to have been damaged by a wrongfully filed notice ofpendency.

(8)

A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on
any motion under this section unless the court finds that:
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or

(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and
costs unjust.

Cite as Utah Code §78B-6-1304
History. Amended by Chapter 306, 2016 General Session, §2,
eff. 5/10/2016. Enacted by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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§78B-6-1304.5. Civil liability for recording wrongful notice of pendencyDamages. Utah Statutes
Title 78B. Judicial Code
~

Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings

Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session
§ 78B-6-1304.5. Civilliability for recording wrongful notice of
pendency -Damages
A person is liable to the record owner of real property, or to a person with a

leasehold interest in the real property that isdamaged bythe
maintenance of a notice ofpendency, for $10,000 or for treble actual
damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and
costs, ifthe person records or causes to be recorded a notice ofpendency
againstthe real property, knowing or having reason to know that:
{ 1) legal action against the property has not been filed as required by
Section 78B-6-1303;

{2) the notice is groundless;

~

{3) the notice fails to comply with the notice requirements of
Subsection 78B-6-1303(2) ; or

(4) the notice contains an intentional material misstatement or false
claim.
Cite as Utah Code§ 78B-6-1304.5
History. Added by Chapter 306, 2016 General Session, §3, eff.
5/10/2016.
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350 P.3d 250 (Utah App. 2015)
2015 UT App. 123
WILLIAM D. WILLIS AND PAULA A. WILLIS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
RAYMOND C. DEWITT AND RC DEWITT CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendants and Appellees No. 20130867-CA
Court of
Appeals of
Utah May
14,2015

Fifth District Court, St. George Department. The Honorable James L.
Shumate. No. 120500368.
Darwin C. Fisher, Attorney for Appellants.
Peter H. Barlow, Sade A. Turner, Heinz J. Mahler, and Andrew R.
Hale, Attorneys for Appellees.
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L.
ROTH concurred.
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Page 251
CHRJSTIANSEN, Judge:

[,Il] William D. and Paula A. Willis appeal from the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Raymond C. DeWitt and RC DeWitt
Construction, Inc. (collectively, DeWitt). We affirm.
Page 252

BACKGROUND
[,r2] In 2005, the Willises contracted with DeWitt for the construction of
a new house in a residential development. Before constructing any houses in
the development, DeWitt discovered that expansive soil was present in
multiple lots in the development.[l] As a result, DeWitt had the top sixteen
feet of soil removed from the affected areas and replaced with compacted fill.

~

DeWitt was aware that the fill mixture included some amount of expansive soil
but believed that the fill would not be expansive and that the fill provided " a
very safe condition to build upon."

[,r3] DeWitt commenced construction on the Willises' house, and the
Willises took possession of the completed home on December 27, 2005. Within
a few months, the Willises began to notice defects in the home that appeared to
be related to earth movement or settlement, such as cracking of their driveway,
N

garage ceiling, and exterior walls. In 2008, the Willises received a letter from a
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neighbor claiming that damage to neighborhood homes was caused by
expansive soil.
[,r4) The Willises filed suit against DeWitt in June 2012, asserting claims

of fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and breach of implied warranty for DeWitt's failure to disclose the
presence of expansive soil in the development. DeWitt moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Willises' claims were time-barred by the relevant
statutes of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
DeWitt on the Willises' fraud and breach- of-implied-warranty claims. The
district court initially denied DeWitt's motion for summary judgment on the
Willises' claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The court explained that" there is a question of fact as to
whether or not any 'fraudulent concealment' took place," which the court
believed could allow the Willises to " invoke the discovery rule and thereby
toll the statute of limitations" with respect to those claims.
(,r5] DeWitt filed a new motion for summary judgment addressing the

fraudulent- concealment issue, and the district court concluded that the
undisputed evidence showed that the Willises had knowledge of their claims on
February 28, 2006. The district court therefore concluded that the Willises'

M
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contract-based claims brought on June 15, 2012, were time-barred under the
six-year limitations period for contract actions against a builder. The Willises
appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(,r6] The Willises challenge the district court's grant of summary

judgment dismissing their claims for breach of contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [2] " [W]e review a district court's grant
of summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial court
correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of
material fact existed." Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ,r 19, 321 P.3d 1089
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS

[,r7] The Willises argue that the district court erred both in concluding
that there was no genuine dispute as to when the Willises had lmowledge of
their claims and in concluding that " the discovery rule does not apply to toll
the statute of limitations." We do not directly reach the issues raised by the
Willises, because we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on
the alternative ground that Utah Code section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is a statute of
repose not subject to equitable tolling and there are no disputed facts regarding
when that statute began to run or when it expired.

~
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Page 253
I. Utah Code Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) Is a Statute of Repose.

(18] " A statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a
specified period of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for
the wrong committed is deemed waived." Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P .2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). " A statute of repose bars all actions
after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event
other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action." Id
Once the statutory period set by a statute of repose expires, " any cause of
action is barred regardless of usual reasons for tolling the statute." Perry v.
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 219 (Utah 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, a party's ignorance of the injury, which is
generally a ground for equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, does not toll
a statute of repose. See id.

[,r9] Utah Code section 78B-2-225 governs actions against providers of
construction
services for work done on a building site. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-225(1)(f),
(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2008)_[3] A homebuilder such as DeWitt is a provider as
defined by the statute, see id § 78B-2LO
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225{l)(f), and section 78B-2-225(3)(a) therefore governs the Willises' claims
here. That subsection states, " An action by or against a provider based in
contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction." Id.

§ 78B-2-225(3)(a). By its plain language, this statute" bars all actions after a
specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than
the occurrence of an injury." See Berry, 717 P.2d at 672. Utah Code section
78B-2-225(3)(a) is therefore a statute ofreposeJ4 ]
[,rtO] This conclusion is bolstered by our supreme court's interpretation
of Utah Code section 78-12-25.5 in Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler

Manufacturing Co., 1999 UT 18,974 P.2d 1194. There, the court concluded
that section 78-12-25.5, a predecessor to section 78B- 2-225, was a statute of

~

repose. Id In Craftsman, the statute at issue stated that " no action for breach
of contract or warranty may be commenced against a provider more than six
years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction"
and established a twelve-year limitations period for all other actions. Id ,I 24
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-25.5(4) (Michie 1996)); see also Utah Code

Ann.§ 78-12-25.5(5). The supreme court held that" [b]ecause these periods
start to run on the date of completion or abandonment of the improvement
without regard to the 'occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of
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action,' they are statutes of repose." Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ,r 26, 974 P.2d
1194 (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 672). The court then concluded that" the
statute of repose provisions are not subject to a discovery rule" and barred the
plaintiffs claims. Id

,r 27. Given that the language of section 78B-2-225(3)(a)

is functionally identical to the language considered in Craftsman, we conclude
that section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is likewise a statute of repose.

p,rtt] The Willises argue that section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is not a statute of
repose because this court, in Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 101, 158 P.3d 562,
affirmed a district court's equitable tolling of the limitations period set forth in
Utah Code section 78-12-21.5(3)(a).
Page 254
Section 78-12-21.5 was recodified in 2008 as section 78B-2-225, and the
relevant provision of section 78B-2-225 is identical to the provision analyzed
in Moore. Compare Utah Code Ann.§ 78- 12-21.5(3)(a) (Lexis Supp. 1999),

with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
However, the issue before this court in Moore was whether a trial court may
apply an equitable discovery rule to a statutory limitations period that does not
include an " internal," or statutory, discovery rule. 2007 UT App. 10 I, ,r ,r 2629, 158 P.3d 562. The question of whether section 78- 12-21.5(3)(a) was a
statute of repose--and thus whether the trial court erred in tolling the
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limitations period on that basis--was never addressed in Moore and does not
appear to have been raised by the appellant as a ground for reversal.[5] Id
Moore therefore did not decide whether section 78-12-21.5(3)(a) was a statute

~

of repose, and its holding is not inconsistent with our conclusion that section
78B-2-225(3)(a) is a statute of repose.
II. The Willises' Contract-Based Claims Are Barred by Utah Code Section

78B-2-225(3)(a). (112] Having concluded that Utah Code section 78B-2225(3)(a) is a statute of repose, we next consider whether the Willises' contract
claims are time-barred under that statute. " An action by or against a provider
based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date
of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction." Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2008). It is undisputed that DeWitt
completed construction and the Willises took possession of the house on
December 27, 2005. The Willises therefore needed to commence
any contract or warranty action against DeWitt within six years of that date.
The Willises did not file suit until June 15, 2012. As a result, their contract
claims are time-barred under the statute.f61We therefore affirm the district
court's summary judgment dismissing the Willises' claims.
CONCLUSION

co
[,rt3] Utah Code section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is a statute of repose and
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~

therefore may not be tolled by application of a discovery rule. The Willises'
contract claims were not brought within six years of the completion of
construction as required by statute, and are thus time-barred. We affirm the
district court's summary judgment.

Notes:
[!]Expansive soil can damage building foundations by swelling as it
absorbs water and contracting as it dries.
[2]The Willises do not appeal the district court's grant of summary
judgment on their fraud or breach-of-warranty claims.
(3 ]Although the Willises' house was completed in December 2005, we cite the
2008 codification of the statute at Utah Code section 78B-2-225 because our
legislature has directed that section 78B- 2-225 "applies to all causes of action
that accrue after May 3, 2003."Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-225(11) (LexisNexis
2008).

~

[41The Willises assert that" [t]he issue of whether Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2225(3)(a) is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations was never presented
to the court or decided by the trial court, and is raised by [DeWitt] for the first
time on [the] Willises' appeal." The Willises therefore argue that we should"

(J\
C1J

refuse to consider" this issue. However, even if we were to conclude that
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DeWitt failed to raise this issue in the district court, that conclusion would not
bar our consideration of the issue, because" [w]e may affirm a judgment on an
unpreserved alternate ground where the alternate ground is apparent on the
record." Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,r 38,216 P.3d 944
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the record is adequate
for us to affirm on this alternative ground, we exercise our discretion to do so
here.
(S]The appellants in Moore v. Smith did argue that" the legislature intended to
hold contract claims related to property improvements outside of the
application of any discovery rule." 2007 UT App. 101, if 28, 158 P .3d 562.
However, this court held that the appellants " provide[d] no authority for this
legislative intent argument," and we rejected the argument without addressing
Gib

its merits.

Id
€t)

[61The Willises' fraudulent-concealment argument is premised on a variation
of the discovery rule that is applicable in cases involving statutes of
limitations. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51-52 (Utah 1996).
Because Utah Code section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is a statute of repose," the
discovery rule cannot operate to toll" the six-year limit. See Kunz v. Kunz ( In

re Marriage ofKunz), 2006 UT App. 151, ,r 21, 136 P.3d 1278. The Willises
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have raised no argument that the circumstances of this case justify an
exception to this rule.

~
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185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947), 6991, Adamson v. Brockbank Page 264
185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947)
~

112 Utah 52
ADAMSON et ux.

v.
BROCKBANK et al
No. 6991
Supreme Court of Utah
October 3, 1947

Page 265
Appeal From District Court, Fourth District, Utah County; Joseph E Nelson, Judge
Action by Thomas W. Adamson and wife against Alan E. Brockbank, Qualie Rich Brockbank,
Federal Homes, Inc., and others to recover damages for destruction of an irrigation ditch and
cancel a quit-claim deed from plaintiffs to named defendants. Judgment for plaintiffs, and named
defendants appeal. On plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal.

G0

Motion denied, judgment set aside, and cause remanded with instructions.
Page 266
D. Eugene Livingston, of Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Christenson & Christenson, of Provo, for respondents.
McDONOUGH, C. J., and WADE, J., concur.
OPINION

Page 267
[112 Utah 58] LATIMER, Justice.
Before treating the merits of this controversy, it is necessary to rule on and dispose of a
motion to dismiss the appeal interposed by plaintiffs after the case had been argued on the merits.
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Judgment for the plaintiff was given by the Trial Court on March 29, 1946. A motion for new
trial was timely filed and was overruled by the court on May 17 1946. On June 2, 1946 plaintiffs
served on defendants a notice that on the 22d day of June, 1946, counsel would move the court
for an order amending the judgment and decree in certain particulars.
1

@

~

1

[112 Utah 59) In the original judgment entered by the court the plaintiffs were awarded
judgment in the sum of$ 3,351.34 against the defendants Alan E. Brockbank, Qualie Rich
Brockbank, and the Federal Homes, Inc. In the latter part of the judgment the court dismissed the
complaint as against 22 defendants including the defendant Federal Homes, Inc. This resulted in
an inconsistency
Page 268
in the judgment with respect to the Federal Homes, Inc.

@

Plaintiffs' motion herein referred to was to strike the name 'Federal Homes, Inc.' from the
latter portion of the decree due to inadvertence and a clerical mistake in including this defendant
with those defendants who were otherwise dismissed.
On June 23, 1946, the court entered an order granting the motion to strike the name 'Federal
Homes, Inc.' from the latter part of the decree and by this order eliminated the inconsistency in the
judgment.

@
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The record is silent as to what parties were present at the time of the hearing on the motion,
so it is impossible to determine whether or not it was resisted. However, in addition to amending
the judgment the court directed the amendment be entered nunc pro tune so as to appear on the
records as of the date of the original judgment.
The notice of appeal was served and filed within 90 days from the date of entry of the nunc
pro tune order but was not within 90 days from the date of the overruling of the motion for new
trial. The question, therefore, presented by the motion to dismiss is this. Did the 90 day time for
appellants to serve and file their notice of appeal begin running as of the date the motion for new
trial was overruled or did it start to run from the date the nunc pro tune order was entered?
Even though the motion to dismiss the appeal was made after the case was argued on its
merits, this court will, on its own motion, determine lack of jurisdiction when the appeal is not taken
in time, where such want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record. Dixie Stockgrowers'
Bank v. Washington County, 81 Utah 429, [112 Utah 60) 19 P.2d 388. Contrary to appellants'
contention, respondents' motion was not too late.
The right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and ought not to be denied
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned. See Boucofski et al. v. Jacobsen et
al., 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 898. The test in the case under consideration is
whether or not this right of appeal has been lost.

~

While different results have been reached in other jurisdictions, the cases of Lukich v. Utah
Construction Co., 48 Utah 452, 160 P. 270, and Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952, settle the
law in this state, as to this question. The rule of law enunciated by this court in these cases, is that,
where a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or modification not changing the
substance or character of the judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tune entry which relates
back to the time the original judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the time for appeal; but
where the modification or amendment is in some material matter, the time begins to run from the
time of the modification or amendment. See also, Obradovich v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 80
Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212.
The modification or amendment in this case changed an inconsistent judgment to one of
consistency, rendering the defendant Federal Homes, Inc., liable when there was previously some
doubt existing as to its liability. In the opinion of the members of this court, this was of sufficient
importance to change the character of the judgment. The order amending the judgment was a
modification of a material matter and enlarged a right running to the plaintiff. While the court may
have had authority to enter the order nunc pro tune, it could not create a right where none existed,

~

or alter an existing right and, by an antedated order, cut down appellants' time in which to appeal.
The effect of the amendment was to create a new judgment for purposes of appeal, and the time
in which [112 Utah 61] an appeal could be taken commenced to run from the date of the entry of
the nunc pro tune order.
This opinion does not treat the rights of the defendants separately. The pleadings, trial,
judgment and appeal of the parties all treat the judgment against the Brockbanks and the Federal
Homes, Inc., as joint and not as joint and several. Therefore, no opinion is expressed on the
question of the effect of a nunc pro tune order on parties not affected by the order, where several
liability exists.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
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Passing now to the merits of the case, the issues between the parties in the action arose out
of the destruction by appellants of an irrigation ditch used by respondents to carry water to
respondents' property located in Utah County, State of Utah. Prior to the time the respondents and
appellants purchased their interests, the property was known and designated as the 'Chipman
Farm'. For all practical purposes the prior owners were the trustee-executors of the estate of
James Chipman, deceased.
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For more than 30 years prior to the time the property was divided and sold to these litigants,
there had been an irrigation ditch crossing the farm. This ditch had been in continuous use for the
30-year period in irrigating certain portions of the farm including that portion purchased by
(it>

respondents. On May 23, 1942, the trustee-executors sold and conveyed to respondents a 10acre portion of the farm. The conveyance was by warranty deed; however, no mention was made
in this deed as to the reservation of any right over and across the property retained by the
Chipman estate.
There is evidence that prior to closing the transaction with respondents, one of the trustees
went over the property with respondent, Thomas W. Adamson, and pointed out the ditch through
which the water must flow to irrigate the tract of land being purchased by him. Subsequent to the
sale to respondent, and on the 22d day of October, 1942, the trustee-executors sold to the
appellants, Alan E. Brockbank and Gaylie Rich Brockbank, a portion of the farm contiguous to and
immediately east of the property previously [112 Utah 62] conveyed to the respondents.
Appellants Alan E. Brockbank and Gaylie Rich Brockbank conveyed the property in turn to the
appellant, Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation which they caused to be organized, and in which

~

they were officers, directors, and stockholders. Appellants also caused the land to be subdivided
and designated the subdivision 'Columbia Village'.
There is further evidence that prior to the time appellants purchased the property, appellant,
Alan E. Brockbank, was taken over the property, walked along the ditch in question, was on a
number of occasions in the immediate vicinity of the ditch, and, while he testified he had no
knowledge of the ditch, the weight of the evidence and the finding of the court is to the contrary.
During the time of Alan E. Brockbank's visits to the property, the ditch was being used by
respondents to carry water to their land. The ditch was from two to four feet wide and from one to
two feet deep, the banks were well defined and, from the weight of the evidence, it clearly appears
the purposes and use of the ditch were readily observable to any one going onto the land.
Between the latter part of February, 1943, and April, 1943, the appellants, in subdividing the

@

property and constructing homes thereon, destroyed the ditch and thereby prevented respondents
from bringing water through the ditch to their property.
Respondents' evidence is to the effect that due to the slope of the ground, it was necessary,
in order to irrigate their property, to have the use of this particular ditch. Appellants' evidence was
that a ditch might be constructed over a different route but this would involve the construction of
levels or embankments of undetermined cost. The court resolved this question of fact in favor of
respondents and found that the crossing of appellants' ground was a way of necessity.
On the 19th day of February, 1943, and prior to the time appellants destroyed the ditch,
respondents executed and delivered to the appellants a quitclaim deed to the property [112 Utah
63] purchased by appellants. The facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of this deed
are detailed more fully in the portion of this opinion dealing with the effect of the deed.
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The court awarded respondents a judgment for their damages resulting from the destruction
of the ditch, and also decreed cancellation of the quitclaim deed insofar as it affected the rights of
appellants. Other defendants were involved in the action until completion of the trial, at which time
the court dismissed the complaint as to all excepting these appellants. The rights of the dismissed
parties are no longer involved in this action.
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It is necessary to discuss three questions to dispose of this appeal. These are: (1) Did
respondents by their purchase from the trustee-executors acquire a right to the use of the ditch
across appellants' property? (2) If such a right was acquired, did the execution of the quitclaim
deed by respondents convey away any such acquired interest? And (3) Was the measure of
damages as awarded by the court proper and were the damages supported by the evidence? We
shall treat these questions in the order stated.
If the judgment can be sustained it must be upheld on the theory that respondents acquired
an easement over appellants' property by implication, inasmuch as no express reservation was
made in the deed to appellants, and no words of grant were included in respondents' deed.
Appellants place reliance on the rule of law that when the language of the instrument is clear
~

and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is determined solely by the terms of the document, and
cite in support thereof the case of Ruthrauff et al. v. Silver King Western Mining Company et al.,
95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338. With this general rule of law we have no dispute. However, the rule is
not applicable in the present action. Section 78-1-11, U.C.A., 1943, provides that a deed in
statutory form shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, of the premises
therein named, together with the appurtenances thereunto belonging. If a deed by statute has the
[112 Utah 64] effect of passing all appurtenances to the property, then it is not varying the terms of
a written instrument to establish what was appurtenant to the property. To hold to the contrary
would render the quoted statute nugatory.

GY
This is not a suit where innocent parties have been misled by public records, by acts and
conduct of the parties, or by reliance on representations made. This is a suit to determine the
rights created between granters and grantees, all of whom knew or should have known that rights
not entirely reflected by recorded deeds were in existence. All parties who subsequently acquired
the property, without either actual or constructive notice, have been dismissed from the action.
The only ones remaining are those parties who had or were charged with knowledge.
In dealing with creation of easements by implication, the Restatement of the Law, Section

~

476, states on page 2978: 'An easement created by implication arises as an inference of the
intention of the parties to a conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from the circumstances
under which the conveyance was made rather than from the language of the conveyance. To draw
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an inference of intention from such circumstances, they must be or must be assumed to be within
the knowledge of the parties. The inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention to
parties who had not thought or had not bothered to put the intention into words, or perhaps more
often, to parties who actually had formed no intention conscious to themselves. In the latter
aspect, the implication approaches in fact, if not in theory, crediting the parties with an intention
which they did not have, but which they probably would have had had they actually foreseen what
they might have foreseen from information available at the time of the conveyance * * *'
The Restatement of the Law sets out certain factors to assist in determining whether the
circumstances under which a conveyance of land is made imply an easement. While the list of
factors therein quoted is not exhaustive, the following are set forth as relevant. Restatement of the
~

Law of Property, paragraph No. 476, page 2977:
[112 Utah 65] 'In determining whether the circumstances under which a conveyance of land
is made imply an easement, the following factors are important:
(a) Whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee,
(b) The terms of the conveyance,
(c} The consideration given for it,
(d} Whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee,
(e) The extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,

(f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee,
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(g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance,
(h) The extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been known to the
parties.'
Before treating the decided cases, it is well to test the facts of this case by the above stated
factors we consider of importance to the decision. (a) The claimants here are the conveyees and
therefore doubts in construing the conveyance should be resolved in their favor. (c) The purchase
@

price of the property is shown and the testimony of Mr. Adamson indicates the use and value of
the water were taken into consideration at the time of the purchase. The deed itself sets forth a
substantial payment for the property, and such consideration infers an intent to transfer rights and
privileges necessary to prevent the land from immediately becoming valueless. (e) The court
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the proper use of the land for the purposes for which it was purchased. The property was
purchased by respondents for farming purposes, and without the use of the ditch the land could
not be effectively used. The granters in this case well knew that without water, the land was of
questionable value for farming uses, and the evidence supports the court's finding that it was not
feasible to bring water to the land over a course different from the one already existing at the time
of purchase. (g) The land had been used for growing irrigated crops prior to the time it was
conveyed to respondents, and the evidence is to the effect that it was contemplated by the
trustees and by the respondents to be and was used in the [112 Utah 66] same manner after
respondents became the owners. No evidence was presented that, as between respondents and
the granters, any change in use was contemplated. (h) As between the grantors and these
respondents, the record shows that the manner of prior use was continuous, open, extensive, and
well known, and that appellant, Alan E. Brockbank, knew of such use prior to his purchase.
Cases involving similar facts and issues have been before this court on previous occasions.
One of the earliest cases touching on similar principles is Fayter v. North, 30 Utah 156, 83 P. 742,
6 L.R.A.,N.S., 410. The facts are similar to the facts in this action and the reasoning persuasive.
Appellant, there as here, raised the question of the possibility of an owner's having an easement
over his own land. Said the court, at page ·110 of 30 Utah, at page 746 of 83 P. 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 410:
'* * * It is insisted, however, for the appellants, that the owner could not create an easement in his
own land, and that, so long as the grantor owned what are now claimed to be the servient estate
and the dominant estate, his use of one for the benefit of the other was a mere exercise of a right
of property over his own land, and in no sense an easement. Whether or not the artificial
arrangement of the material properties of his estate by the owner, constituted a technical
easement is, under the facts and circumstances of this case, immaterial. It clearly created a
condition to the land sold partaking of the character of an easement, constituting at least a quasi
easement, visible to the purchaser, and one of the things in the minds of the parties when the
bargain of sale was made. The contract of sale was made with reference to it as a part of the
subject-matter, and was thus treated as, and in fact became, quasi appendant to the land sold,
and the vendor could not thereafter derogate from his own grant. The presumption of law is that
the parties contracted with a view to the condition of the property as it actually was at the time of
the transaction, and after sale neither one had a right, without the consent of the other, to change
that condition, which openly and visibly existed, to the detriment of the other. The deed conveyed
the land with all the benefits and burdens appendant or quasi appendant thereto, and the vendee
could neither shake off the burdens nor could the vendor take away the benefits that were open
and visible at the time of sale.'
Again, in the case of Rollo v. Nelson, 34 Utah 116, 124, 96 P. 263, 265, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 315,
this court dealt with [112 Utah 67] the subject of implied easements. Chief Justice McCarty,
speaking for the court, reaffirmed the holding of Fayter v. North, and said: 'The most important
question, however, in
Page 272
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this case is, did the easement in and to the cement walk pass as an appurtenance to the lots
purchased by appellants? This question must be answered in the affirmative; for it is a wellG¼)

recognized rule of law that, on a severance of an estate by a sale of a part thereof, all easements
of a permanent character, that have been created in favor of the land sold, and which are open
and plain to be seen, and are reasonably necessary for its use and convenient enjoyment, unless
expressly reserved by the grantees, pass as appurtenances to the land. ***This doctrine is
tersely, and, as we think, correctly stated in the case of Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178, 86 Am.Dec.
577. In the syllabus of the opinion it is said: 'Servitudes, adopted by the owner of land, which are
plainly visible or notorious, and from the character of which it may fairly be presumed that he
intended their preservation as necessary to the convenient enjoyment of his property, become,
when the lands are divided and pass into other hands, permanent appurtenances thereto, and the
owner of neither the dominant nor servient portions of the land has power adversely to interfere
with their proper use and enjoyment.'
Both parties refer to the case of Morris v. Blunt, et al., 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127, but neither

@

party touches on the principles of law in that case as they affect the issues in this action. The
controlling element in that case can be found on page 254 of 49 Utah, on page 1132 of 161 P ..
where the following statements appear:
'An appurtenance implied upon a severance of title is referred to the intent of the granter,
and such intent is gathered from conditions existing at the time of the severance of title and
implied from such circumstances; and, in general terms, the rule may be stated that when the
owner of a tract of land has arranged and adapted the various parts so that one derives a benefit
and advantage from the other of a continuous and obvious character, and he sells one of the parts
without making mention of the incidental advantage or burdens of one in respects to the other,
there is implied an understanding and agreement that such advantages and burdens continue as
before the separation of title. * * *

(j

'The elements essential to constitute an easement by severance are: (1) Unity of title
followed by severance; (2) That at the time of the (112 Utah 68] severance the servitude was
apparent, obvious, and visible; (3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
the dominant estate; and (4) It must usually be continuous and self-acting, as distinguished from
one used only from time to time when occasion arises.'
The case was decided against the grantee because of insufficient evidence to support a
finding of necessity.
The next case in point of time was La Bee v. Smith, 64 Utah 242, 229 P. 88, 90. The facts as
found by the trial court were these: At one time C. S. Kinney owned the parcels of land held by the
litigants at the time of the trial. About 40 years prior to the trial, Kinney had constructed a ditch
over the property including the lands purchased by plaintiff and defendant. Kinney sold his
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property in parcels to diverse persons and in each conveyance conveyed all water rights
belonging to the land. In no case did Kinney subject the land of plaintiff to the said ditch nor did he
grant to other purchaser the right to run water through the same. The ditch was conspicuous,
could be seen by any one going onto plaintiffs farm, and had been in continuous use for a long
time. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from using the ditch for conveying water across plaintiffs
land.
While the case deals mostly with the weight of the evidence the following quotation is

~

pertinent: 'La Bee contends that, as both pieces of property were once owned by Kinney, Kinney
could not acquire the prescriptive right for an easement for a ditch over a piece of his own land in
favor of another, and when he sold the land claiming the easement, could not, therefore, convey
the easement. Counsel does not cite any authority in support of this position, and we know of
none. If the Y ditch had existed and been used by Smith and his predecessors in interest for 20
years, and was visible when the plaintiff purchased his property, as the court found, we know of no
reason why such an easement would not pass with the title to the land to which it was
appurtenant.'
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Shortly after the decision in the La Bee case, supra, this court again dealt with the question
of implied easement. In Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah 509, 243 P. 922, it was held that [112 Utah 69]
no easement could be implied under the facts of that case. The court took the opportunity to
differentiate the case from the La Bee case, on two grounds. Firstly, the time element in the
conveyances was reversed. That is, in the case then before the court, the one seeking to enforce
the claim of implied easement had to trace his title to one who had acquired title after the time of
acquisition by the party seeking to deny the easement. To enforce the right in the Alcorn case
would be to permit the grantor to derogate from his grant rather than to enlarge it for the benefit of
the grantee. This is a controlling difference, as the court went on to say, at page 514 of 66 Utah, at
page 924 of 243 P.: 'If the order of making the conveyance by the Russon Investment Company to
O'Brien and the respondent here were reversed, so as to give the respondent priority in point of
time, the case of Lampman v. Milks [21 N.Y. 505, 507], supra, would be strongly in point.***.'
Other material facts such as a change in the use of the estate from a farm to a subdivided
village, and lack of knowledge of prior use on the part of the other purchasers, either actual or
constructive, were passed over by the court, inasmuch as the appeal was decided on the question
of condemnation.
While the Alcorn v. Reading case is readily distinguishable from the other cases in this
jurisdiction on other grounds previously referred to in this opinion, the court based its decision on
the right of condemnation. We quote from the opinion as published on page 520 of 66 Utah, on
page 926 of 243 P.: '***We base our decision, however, upon the proposition that an easement
for an irrigation ditch upon the theory of an implied reservation does not exist in this state, however
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necessary the easement may be, for the reason that the statute of eminent domain provides a
complete remedy by proceedings in condemnation.'
The statement of facts as given in the opinion of the case just referred to does not give a
clear picture of how easy or how difficult it might have been to condemn a right [112 Utah 70] of
way. Neither do the facts indicate what might have been the costs and expenses incident to such
a procedure. It may have been that the topographical condition present in that case permitted the
@

construction of a ditch with little or no cost, and over property of little or no value. Be that as it may,
the evidence in the case at bar shows conclusively that to bring water in over a different course
would require construction of levees and embankments to overcome the natural slope of the
ground. Just what the cost of this construction would be is not disclosed by the record. However,

~

the record does indicate that because of the contour of the ground and a ridge running through the
property of respondents, a reasonable necessity exists for bringing the water to the land of
respondents across the land purchased by appellants.
To follow the rule of law as announced in the above quoted portion of the case of Alcorn v.
Reading would mean that regardless of necessity, a person could never acquire an easement by
implication when the easement was for the purpose of conveying water, because a right of
condemnation exists. To hold this to be the law would carry the doctrine of necessity far beyond
that announced in any other case, and would destroy the principle that where one grants property

GD

to another he thereby grants him the reasonable and necessary means of enjoying it, whether
expressed or not.
The various states have adopted different degrees of necessity, but the tendency in recent

@

decisions is toward the concept that no more than a reasonable necessity is required. Cases in
this jurisdiction prior to the case of Alcorn v. Reading seem to follow this principle. Such principles
as 'absolute necessity' and 'indispensable necessity' have yielded to the rule that the necessity
requisite to the creation of an easement by implication is sufficient if it is a 'reasonable' necessity.
(See 17 Am. Jur. page 943). If this test
Page 274
is applied, the rule of necessity in water cases is the same as in other cases.
[112 Utah 71] The case at bar is illustrative of the reason why the right of condemnation
does not nullify the doctrine of reasonable necessity. If the course to be condemned had to be
constructed through Columbia Village, which is now built up with homes, then the cost of obtaining
the right of way might well exceed the value of the estate acquired by respondents. If it were not
practical to construct the ditch through the village, it would be necessary for respondents to
condemn and construct a ditch around the subdivision. That such condemnation might require the
payment for other expensive properties is entirely possible and the costs of condemnation,
together with additional construction costs, might prohibit recourse to this procedure.
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To the extent that the case of Alcorn v. Reading holds there can be no easement by implied
grant because of the right to condemn, it is overruled. The true test is the reasonable necessity
existing therefor, and we reaffirm this principle. If an alternate way permits a grantee to make use
of his land at little or no cost, the availability of this means might be a factor in determining the
necessity of the easement. However, to infer an intent not to convey a right to the ditch only
because a right to condemn exists, overlooks the fact that condemnation proceedings ofttimes
involve expensive and uncertain litigation, and violates the principle that the inference of intention
must be drawn from all the circumstances under which the conveyance is made, and not from one
alone.
The trial court did not err in finding the plaintiffs had a right to the use of the ditch.
~

On the 1oth day of February, 1943, appellants obtained a quitclaim deed from respondents
covering the entire tract of land owned by the appellants. The facts and circumstances pertaining
to the execution and delivery of this deed as found by the court and reflected by the record were
these: After appellants, the Brockbanks. acquired the Columbia Village tract, a title insurance
company discovered a discrepancy in the boundary line between appellants' and respondents'
property. In [112 Utah 72] order to borrow money to finance the construction program it was
necessary that title insurance be obtained, and this could not be accomplished until the title to the
strip in dispute was cleared. Alan E. Brockbank then prepared a quitclaim deed and importuned
the respondents to sign it. The respondents at first refused to sign the deed, but subsequently,
after a number of visits by appellant, Alan E. Brockbank, and after he had repeatedly informed
respondents the sole purpose of the deed was to clear up the discrepancy in the boundary,
appellants executed the deed. No consideration was paid for the deed, and no discussion was had
with respect to the respondents' releasing their rights to the use of the ditch. Appellant Brockbank

~

never considered that respondents had quitclaimed their right to the use of the ditch until he
discussed it with his attorney, and if Alan E. Brockbank intended to obtain more than a correction
of an erroneous description, then he misrepresented his intentions to respondents.
That respondents did not understand that their rights to the use of the ditch were included in
the deed, and that they relied on the statements of the appellant, Brockbank, to the effect that the
deed was only for the purpose of clearing up the discrepancy, is the only logical conclusion this
court can reach after reading the evidence contained in the record. The record further indicates,
and the trial court so found, that Brockbank had knowledge of the existence of the easement and
also the he knew that his representations to the Adamsons (as to the purpose and the effect of this
quitclaim deed) were not true. Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to justify the
trial court in setting aside the deed, but with this contention we cannot agree. In the opinion of this
court, the evidence amply supports the findings of the trial court in this respect.
The testimony indicates there was no consideration for the deed. This is at variance with the
stated consideration of $ 1O; however, no United States revenue stamps appear on the deed, and
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this is consistent with no consideration. 16 Am.
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Jur. p. 456 sets forth the general rule with respect [112 Utah 73] to the effect of inadequacy or
want of consideration. The text states: '* * * However, if the inadequacy of consideration is so
glaring as to stamp the transaction with fraud and to shock the common sense of honesty, a court
@

of equity will intervene. If the consideration is grossly inadequate, equity in any case will lay hold of
slight circumstances of oppression, fraud or duress, in order to rescind the conveyance.
1

Inadequacy of consideration tends to show fraud, where other circumstances point to
misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, oppression, abuse of a confidential relationship,
etc.***'
Granted that a quitclaim deed given to correct a boundary discrepancy may recite a nominal
consideration and yet be legally effective; however, when, as here, a party claims a valuable and
additional right was released or quitclaimed 1 then the adequacy of the consideration becomes
@

important. To insist that respondents conveyed away a right as valuable as the one herein
involved, without consideration, shocks one's sense of justice, and the court should scrutinize all
the facts to determine whether the conveyance was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or
trickery. As previously indicated, we are not concerned with the rights of bona fide purchasers; we

~

are only concerned with the rights between the parties to the transaction.
The trial court could have resolved this question against the appellants on one of two
grounds: Firstly, if the court found that appellant, Brockbank, had no knowledge of the existence of
the ditch and none of the parties to the deed had any intention of dealing with the rights to the
ditch, then it would have been a case of mutual mistake as to the extent of the property conveyed.
A court of equity can set aside a deed where there has been mutual mistake as to the interest of
the granter in the property conveyed, whether it be a mistake of fact or law. (See 26 C.J.S.,
Deeds, § 55, page 272). As said in 16 Am.Jur. 466: 'in other words, if a deed does not express the

<i

agreement of the parties to it, if there is such an agreement, it is immaterial whether a mistake
therein made is one of law or fact.'
(112 Utah 74] The second ground and the one which influenced the trial court to set aside
the deed was fraud and misrepresentation. Can this holding be sustained under the previous
decisions of this court? Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Corp., 87 Utah 69, 48 P.2d
439, is quoted by the appellants in support of their contention that the court erred. The decision at
page 76 of 87 Utah, at page 442 of 48 P.2d quotes the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Southern Development Company v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 8 S.Ct. 881,
31 L.Ed. 678: 'In order to establish a charge of this character the complainant must show by clear
and decisive proof: First, that the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact;
secondly, that such representation is false; thirdly, that such representation was not actually
believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true; fourthly, that it was made with intent
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that it should be acted on; fifthly, that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and, sixthly,
that in so acting on it the complainant was ignorant of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to be
true.***'

~

Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, appellant Brockbank made a
representation of a material fact in that he represented that the purpose of the deed was solely to
clear up the discrepancy in the boundaries. That such representation was false is amply supported
by the acts and conduct of appellant Brockbank. He was in the real estate business, had handled
many conveyances of property, was familiar with the legal effect of deeds, prepared the deed so it
covered more property than was intended, denied he intended to include the rights to the use of
the ditch, and yet later insisted that the deed had extinguished respondents' rights. The court
found that during the time Brockbank was negotiating with respondents for this quitclaim deed he
had knowledge of the existence of the easement, and although he testified to the contrary, the
court was fully justified in disbelieving his testimony. Many witnesses, including residents of
Columbia Village, testified the ditch was clearly visible even after the houses were built and
occupied. When [112 Utah 75] Brockbank made the

~
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statement to respondents that the only effect of the deed was to clear up the existing discrepancy
in the boundary lines, he did not actually believe, upon reasonable grounds, that the
representation was true. The representation was made with intention that it would be acted upon,
and was acted upon by respondents to their detriment. Furthermore, respondents were obviously
ignorant of its falsity, yet reasonably believed it to be true. These facts, under the rules of law
previously announced by this court, clearly makes out a case of fraud and misrepresentation.

~

Black, in his text on Rescission of Contracts, paragraph 68, at page 172, lists four additional
elements of 'actionable fraud', only two being of any importance to this case: (1) 'The
representation must relate to a past or present matter of fact, not a matter of law, must not be
merely promissory, and must not be put forward simply as an expression of opinion; and (2) The
circumstances must have been such as to justify the defrauded party in relying on the
representation, as a basis of his own decision or action, without making an independent
investigation of its truth or falsity, or he must have been in some way dissuaded or prevented from
making a sufficient investigation * * *'
The case of Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Company, et al., 80 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 623,
626, is cited by appellants as controlling in this case. That case holds as quoted by counsel 'the
general rule is that misrepresentations of law or of the legal effect of contracts and writings does
not constitute remedial fraud.' There is also, however, the following statement which must be given
weight: 'There are exceptions to the rule, or rather circumstances or conditions rendering it
inapplicable, but none of them are here present.'
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In the situation confronting us we have other circumstances and conditions. We need not go
into these, as the [112 Utah 76] representation here was one of fact, i.e., that the purpose and
effect of the deed was only to fix the boundary. If appellant, Alan Brockbank, was falsely intending
to obtain more under the deed, then this was a misrepresentation as to his intentions. This is the
case of a grantee inducing the granter to execute a deed which, unbeknown to the granter
because of his ignorance of such matters, conveyed much more than the granter intended it to
convey. What rights the grantee, appellants in this case, intended to acquire under this deed is not
a question of law but a question of fact.

@

@

®
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In considering the last of the principles above quoted, it is sufficient to state that appellant
Brockbank, by virtue of his superior knowledge; by his act of taking respondents to the courthouse
and pointing out the plats which revealed the existing discrepancy; by assuring respondents he
would satisfy their mortgagee that the quitclaim deed was only for the purpose of clearing up the
discrepancy; by obtaining clearances from the mortgagee of respondents' property; and by having
a representative of the title insurance company further assure them of the necessity and purpose
of the deed; all these were such circumstances as justified respondents in relying on Brockbank's
representations without making an independent investigation.
The last question to dispose of is: 'Did the court correctly assess the damages? In the
judgment as entered the Court separates the monetary award of the judgment into two parts. The
first part of the decree grants judgment against the appellants in the sum of$ 1,202.84. The
judgment and decree does not indicate on its face how this sum was determined. The second part
of the judgment awards respondents the sum of$ 2,000 for damages suffered by reason of the
destruction of the ditch, in the event the ditch is not reconstructed within 60 days. The findings of
fact indicate the sum of$ 1,202.84 was allowed by the court on account of special damages
suffered by respondents during the year 1943 and 1944. However, the findings do not separate
the damages as to the specific items alleged in respondents' complaint. The findings of [112 Utah
77] fact also include an element of damages in the sum of$ 2,000, but again, no information is
included as to how the court arrived at this amount.
1

The record has been searched, and it is impossible to find therein sufficient evidence to
sustain the court's findings on both the general and special damages.
~

@

Page 277
Treating the general damages first, the only evidence in the record consists of witnesses'
stating their opinions as to the value of the land with water, and the value of the land without
water. If this testimony determined the proper element of damage, there would be sufficient
evidence to justify the finding. However, this is not a proper or correct method of determining this
element. The true test is the difference in the value of the land with and without the easement,
which in this case consisted of the ditch. The water or its value was not destroyed. Respondents
still have their stock and the right to the use of the water. They have only been denied the conduit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

through which the water could pass. In some cases the same results might be obtained, and
others it might not. By way of illustration, suppose in the present action a new ditch might be
constructed for$ 1,500. The element of damage would not then be $ 2,000. It would only be the
cost of replacing the ditch. Again, if the cost of bringing water to the land were in excess of the
difference between the value of the land with and without the ditch, then the true element of
damage would be the difference in value of the land with and without water less the value of the
use of the water, or for practical purposes, the value of the water stock. The court undoubtedly
realized this when it provided the ditch be replaced or, if this were not done, then that respondents
have judgment for$ 2,000. The difficulty is, the record is barren of any evidence of the cost of
replacing the ditch. The effect of the judgment as based on the evidence is to recompense
respondents for destruction of the ditch plus the destruction of the right to the use of the water
which they still own.
There is a memorandum in the file showing the manner in which the court arrived at the
above stated sums of$ 2,000 [112 Utah 78) and$ 1,202.84, but this memorandum is not properly
before the court. It is not part of the judgment roll and was not incorporated in the bill of
~

exceptions. Where the opinion of the trial court is settled in the bill of exceptions and is made part
of the record, this court may look to it to ascertain the trial court's reasons for its decision, but such
reasons do not amount to a judicial finding, and are without any judicial effect. Headlund v. Daniels

et al., 50 Utah 381, 167 P. 1170. The mere fact that a document is in the file does not permit this
court to consider it as being before the court. Section 104-30-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, has
prescribed what constitutes the judgment roll, and a trial judge's memorandum is not therein
included. If litigants desire that items not listed in Section 104-30-14 be considered by this court,
they must include them in the bill of exceptions.
This is an appeal wherein it is well to direct attention of counsel to the rules of this court. The
special damages alleged by plaintiffs consist of nine items. These range from the cost of digging a
well to damages for the loss of various crops. Appellants assign insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the findings and both parties argue the question in their briefs. Yet in only three instances is
any reference made to the places in the transcript of 637 pages where testimony concerning
damages can be found, and those references only go to two items of the special damages. The
balance of the facts, if any, are buried in the transcript, and their presence or absence has been
left to this court to determine. Rule VIII of this court requires appellant to set forth a brief and
concise statement of facts, giving reference to the pages of the record supporting the statement of

Gi;;

such facts. If respondent agrees with the statement he shall so indicate. If he contradicts them, he
shall state wherein the facts are contradicted, and make a statement and reference in his brief to
the record where the statement of appellant is contradicted. This applies equally to all questions of
fact, including those of damages, if counsel intend to raise the insufficiency of the evidence to
sustain [112 Utah 79] the findings of the court. Litigants are entitled to have their rights determined
with reasonable dispatch, and the rules adopted are for the purpose of expediting the decision on
appeal. To ignore the rules or only partially comply with them defeats this purpose.
lJj
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Plaintiffs in their complaint allege special damages in the amount of$ 2,245. The individual
items are these: Alfalfa destroyed, $ 100; grain on three acres of land which plaintiffs were
prevented from planting, $ 100; alfalfa crop for 1944 which plaintiffs were prevented from realizing,

$ 100; grain on three additional acres of land which plaintiffs were prevented from planting, $ 120;
1/2 acre Of cucumbers which plaintiffs were prevented from planting,$ 300; loss of 1 1/4 acre of
potatoes, $ 500; cost of digging well, $ 400; garden crops and fruit destroyed, $ 125; punitive
damages,$ 500.
Nowhere in the judgment or findings of fact or conclusions of law could we find any indication
of what amount the court allowed for any of these items. This necessitated checking the record to
determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence on enough of the items to justify the total
award.
The item of$ 500 for punitive damages can be eliminated without further discussion,

®

because there is no finding by the court that appellants or any one of them acted in a malicious or
wilful manner. As to the balance of the items, it would unduly lengthen the opinion to set out the
evidence in the record, or lack of it, in regard to the costs and expenses of producing the crops,
their market value at maturity, and other elements necessary to establish the true measure of

(j)

damages. Suffice it to say there is sufficient evidence to establish the damages for loss of alfalfa
for the years 1943 and 1944. These, however, could not exceed the amount of $ 200 set up in the
complaint. The record is entirely barren of any evidence touching on damages for loss of
cucumbers, so this item must be eliminated. Any award for potatoes must likewise fail. While the
record indicates that a previous tenant raised 700 bushels [112 Utah 80] to the acre, and that
respondents had planted potatoes during the spring of 1943, there is no evidence as to the costs
of planting and raising, nor is there any evidence as to the market value for any year. Another
cogent reason why damages for loss of potatoes cannot be awarded can be gleaned from a
statement by respondent, Thomas W. Adamson, to the effect that he marketed a few bushels of

~

the potatoes. Just how many bushels he sold or how much he received for them remains
unanswered. The only evidence in the record in regard to garden crops, berries and fruit destroyed
is that respondents purchased 1,250 strawberry plants at $12.50 per thousand, and 1,000
raspberry bushes at an undisclosed price. The former he lost, and of the latter he saved about
half.
There is considerable evidence in the record regarding the qualify of the land for raising
sugar beets. Also as to the cost of planting and harvesting, the market values for the year 1943,
and the yield per acre. This cannot assist respondents, for the reasons that no allegations are
made in the complaint that respondents suffered any damages for the loss of beets, and obviously
if damages were awarded for destruction of one crop for a given acreage, damages for destruction
of another crop for the same acreage could not be awarded.
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Respondents testified that they had prepared some eight and one-half acres of land to be
seeded with wheat; however, it was not planted because of the lack of water. It therefore appears
that if the court awarded damages for loss of grain, that respondents were awarded damages for
profits on future crops. This is not a proper element of damage if the destruction of an easement is

~

permanent and damages are awarded for the destruction. In 28 C.J.S., Easements,§ 114, page
822, what we deem to be the correct rule is stated by the author in these words: '* * * If the
obstruction is permanent the measure of damages is the difference in the market value of the
owner's property with the passway open and with it closed, or, as otherwise stated, the difference
between the reasonable market value of the land immediately before [112 Utah 81] it was known
that the way would be obstructed and its market value immediately after it was destroyed.***'
Whether or not the court included the $ 400 for the well is also not properly before us.
Regardless of whether it did or not, the record is unsatisfactory on the amount of damage.
Respondent stated it
Page 279
cost him $ 400 to sink the well. However, the record fairly indicates that respondents had no
culinary water, and were unable to get the City of American Fork to furnish it. The question of
whether or not the ditch water was potable is not answered satisfactorily by the record.
Respondent in answer to a question testified that such water could be used for drinking and
cooking purposes if it had to be. He further testified that even though the water came in turns and
was not available daily, it might be possible to collect and use it for culinary purposes if he
constructed a cistern. If the well was drilled for culinary purposes and was necessary for this
reason, regardless of the destruction of the ditch, then it was not a proper element of damage. In
~

addition, if the court awarded respondents full damage for permanent destruction of the easement,
and the right to the use of culinary water was included in the easement, it is difficult to determine
how respondents would then be entitled to an additional award for the cost of digging the well.
This is in effect permitting respondents of recover for both permanent destruction and for partial
replacement.
There is mention made in appellants' brief of an award for rent and in respondents' brief of
the fact that the rental value of the property was of sufficient amount to justify the court in its
award. One answer to this is, assuming rental value to be a proper element of damage,
respondents failed to allege or claim this in their complaint. Again, it is impossible to determine
from the record before us whether or not this was considered by the trial court in arriving at the
sum total of special damages. While the memorandum so indicates, as previously suggested, this
is not properly before us.

~

[112 Utah 82] In view of the fact that this case is being remanded for a redetermination of
the amount of damages, it is considered advisible to set forth out opinion on the proper elements
of damages, as presently pleaded.
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For general damages, the difference in the value of the land with and without the ditch. For
special damages, the actual expenditures by respondents for the purchase of seed for the year
1943, the expenses incurred in preparing the land for cultivation; the loss of crops already planted
or already in existence for the year 1943, if not included in the value of the land before destruction
of the easement; the cost of digging the well if the water running through the ditch were usable for
culinary purposes, and this was not taken into account in the destruction of the easement; and
interest on the amount awarded as damages, at the legal rate from the date of the destruction of
(r!l)

the easement.
The damages as set out above are based on the assumption that the destruction of the ditch
is permanent. However Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion rightly calls attention to the fact

@

that no opinion is expressed on the elements of damages in the event the trial court permits the
reconstruction of the ditch. If the trial judge orders and the appellants reconstruct a satisfactory
substitute, then respondents would not be entitled to recover the$ 2,000 for depreciation in the
value of the land. In lieu of this element, the respondents would be entitled to recover the
difference between the reasonable rental value of the property (effected by the destruction of the
ditch) with water, and the reasonable rental value of the property without water from the date of
the destruction to the date of the replacement. The other elements of damage to remain the same
except interest. If the respondents are awarded damages for crops destroyed in 1943, then so
much of the land as was used for growing these crops should not be included for reasonable

@

rental purposes for that year.
The judgment is set aside and remanded with instructions to determine the damages
suffered by respondents, in accordance with the view expressed herein. Plaintiff to be [112 Utah

c;;,

83] permitted to amend the pleadings with regard to damages, if so desired. Each party to bear his
own costs.

CONCUR BY: WOLFE
WOLFE, Justice (concurring). I concur in the order denying the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the amendment to the judgment changed the substance or character of the judgment.

I am not prepared to say that the time for appeal would not have run from the date of the
overruling of the motion for a new trial, had not the motion to amend the judgment been timely
@

made and especially when made within 90 days of the date of the overruling of motion for a new
trial.
As stated by Mr. Justice Pratt in his dissent. it should have been obvious to the appellants
that the clerical error introducing a substantial inconsistency in the judgment was an inadvertence.

@

I am not prepared to say that they could have used it as a means of indefinitely postponing the
running of the time to appeal. But in this case they knew that [112 Utah 88] there was a motion to
eliminate the mistaken inclusion of Federal Homes, Inc., among the list of defendants in regard to
which the complaint had been dismissed and that the motion was granted. I think they may have
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reasonably relied on a conclusion that the alteration was one which changed the character of the
judgment and that we would so find. It certainly did that on the face thereof, even though the
defendants must have appreciated the fact that inclusion of Federal Homes, Inc., among the list of
those in regard to whom the complaint was dismissed was an obvious mistake. I prefer to lean in
favor of rulings which preserve the right of appeal rather than those that take it away, when there
is doubt.
In that part of the prevailing opinion which treats the application of the factors to be taken
into consideration set out in Sec. 476, page 2977 of the Restatement of the Law of Property, in
determining whether an easement should be implied, I point out that it is not necessarily meant
that in each case each factor from {a) to {h) both inclusive will play a part. Consideration of some
of the factors may result in a conclusion that they are not helpful in a particular case. The list is
given in an attempt to present a fairly complete roster of factors which may in various cases come
into play. The opinion itself recognizes that, for in the instant case it omits mention of factors (b),
(d), and (f), which I agree have no applicability to this case.
The majority opinion states that the trial court could have rescinded the quitclaim deed on
either the ground of mistake or fraud. As an abstract proposition this may be correct, but I think it
unnecessary to consider the ground of mistake. In this case the court found that Brockbank
realized that Adamson was not aware that the quitclaim deed would in legal effect relinquish all his
~

right to the easement, but that he {Adamson) only intended it to have a limited effect; that
Brockbank must have known that Adamson did not know that it would have that effect. Since the
deed was given for Brockbank's benefit for a limited purpose and without consideration to
Adamson, there was placed upon (112 Utah 89] Brockbank a duty not to take advantage of his

~

realization of the impression under which Adamson was laboring. Brockbank was placed by these
circumstances in a relationship to Adamson which invested him (Brockbank) with a duty to
disclose the full import of a quitclaim deed. I see no objection to the theory of the main opinion that
an announcement by Brockbank that his sole intention was to straighten out boundaries was a
statement of a fact- his state of mind --which he intended Adamson to act upon, and that
Adamson in relying on that fact did act upon it, and so if Brockbank had may further intention, he
fraudulently misrepresented the fact of his state of mind. I assume that the result would be the
same in this case had there been a consideration of $ 1O for the quitclaim deed.

~

This case is to be remanded for further proceedings as to the matter of damages. As to the
elements of damage the opinion advances certain advice and guides to the lower court in order
that they may be fixed in view of several possible contingencies which may be contained in that
judgment. I agree with that part of the opinion, but I add the following by way of supplementation to
which the main opinion makes allusion.
When a farmer purchases land he can either farm it or rent it to tenants. In either case he will
receive a return on his investment. When for a substantial period of time he is precluded from
using his land, he thereby fails to receive a return on his investment. He is entitled to
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compensation for this loss. On the other hand, some wrong-doers might permanently destroy a
part of his land, which would immediately entitle him to compensation for the resulting loss in
value. (In this case the$ 2,000 mentioned in the prevailing opinion). He would thereby receive
back a part of his capital investment. The court does not award him compensation for annual loss
of income in the future because he can reinvest the compensation for the permanent injury to his
land, and this new investment will afford him earnings in the future in place of those he lost by the
destruction of his land. And by giving him legal interest on the damages [112 Utah 90] from the
date of deprivation he will be compensated as if he had had the money invested. But in this case if
the easement is restored the plaintiffs should be reimbursed for the loss occasioned by this
enforced idleness in place of the element of permanent loss.
~

The following distinction should be pointed out: Where an easement is quite obviously
permanently destroyed at the outset, as would be the case where a substantial building is erected
across the way, the easement owner would be obligated to mitigate his damages by promptly
realizing whatever he could on his property, as by selling it or putting it to a new use. He could not

@J

leave it idle to pile up damages. In the case before us, however, plaintiff apparently did not know
that the obstruction would not be removed, and could not be expected to sell his land, though if he
could have rented it at a reduced rate, he should have done so.
What is the measure of damages for the loss resulting from the enforced idleness of the
land? Since its purpose is to provide an appropriate annual return on the value of the landowner's
investment, it would seem this could best be done by allowing legal interest on the value of the
land with water for the period during which plaintiffs were denied the use thereof less the profits, if
any, made on the land without water during that period. However, the cases indicate that the

~

injured party is allowed the fair rental value, rather than interest, for the period during which the
use of the land was denied. So, in Gila Water Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 238 P.

336, 337, where defendants wrongfully diverted water from the plaintiffs' land, the court said:'***
where land is prepared for growing crops but the same is not planted and cultivated by reason of
@

the wrongful act of another, the measure of damages in such case is the reasonable rental value
of the land during the time the land was prevented from being cropped by reason of such wrongful
act.'
To like effect are Dilday v. David, et al., 1939, 178 Ark. 898, 12 S.W.2d 899; and Ft. Worth &

D. C. Ry. Co. v. Speer, Tex.Civ.App., 1919, 212 S.W. 762.
[112 Utah 91] If the further taking of testimony reveals that the land had any rental value
during the period the easement was obstructed, that should be deducted from the fair rental value
@)

of the land with water.

DISSENT BY: PRATT
PRATT, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the principles
discussed upon the merits, but invite attention to this dissent as the motion to dismiss.
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A motion for dismissal of this appeal has been interposed upon which the following issue is
raised:
Is an appeal within time which is taken within 90 days from the date of entry of a nunc pro
tune order amending the judgment, but after 90 days from the date of the overruling of the motion
for a new trial?
The factual background for this discussion is a follows:
Among the defendants in this action is the Federal Homes Inc. Of that defendant the findings of

fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree have this to say:
From the findings of fact:
'11. That on or about the 24th day of February, 1943, said Alan E. Brockbank and Gaylie
Rich Brockbank conveyed to the Federal Homes Inc., the said lands over which said irrigation
ditch and right-of-way passes, and that at the time of said conveyance said Alan E. Brockbank
was an officer of the said Federal Homes Inc., to-wit, its President, and during all of the times
hereinbefore mentioned he was such officer of the said Federal Homes Inc., and continued to be
such officer until the time of the trial hereof.'
'12. The court further finds that at various dates between the 24th day of February, 1943 and
the 26th day of March, 1943, said defendants, Alan E. Brockbank and Gaylie Rich Brockbank and
the Federal Homes Inc., a corporation, and their agents and servants, entered upon the said
irrigation ditch and right-of-way against the will and without the consent of the plaintiffs and filled
up and destroyed said irrigation ditch and thereby prevented the plaintiffs from the use thereof and
from obtaining water owned by them through the said irrigation ditch and thereby made it
impossible for the said plaintiffs to irrigate the crops growing upon their said lands and thereby
causing the destruction and loss of said crops for want of water, and on account of said ditch
being filled up and destroyed plaintiffs were prevented from planting, growing and [112 Utah 84]
maturing other crops during the crop seasons of 1943 and 1944 and were put to great damage
and expense in providing water for culinary and domestic purposes.'*****
'18. The court further finds that the plaintiffs by reason of the actions of the defendants, Alan
E. Brockbank and Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal Homes Inc., a corporation, and of their
servants and agents, in filling up and destroying the said irrigation ditch of the plaintiffs and
preventing them from conveying water to their lands herein described for the necessary irrigation
of their crops and on account of depriving them from the use of said property in the raising of
crops during the years of 1943 and 1944 said plaintiffs suffered damages in the sum of$ 1202.84.'
(Finding No. 19 refers to additional damage.)*****

M
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'22. The court further finds that at the time of the purchase by the other individual defendants
of their respective homes from the Federal Homes, Inc., said individual defendants purchased said
homes for a valuable consideration and without any notice or knowledge of any claim or interest of
the plaintiffs to any right-of-way or irrigation ditch over the property thus purchased.'
From the conclusions of law:
'1. That the plaintiffs, Thomas W. Adamson and Mina Adamson, are entitled to the judgment
of this court awarding to them damages against the defendants, Alan E. Brockbank, Gaylie Rich
Brockbank and the Federal Homes Inc., a corporation, in the sum of$ 1202.84 together with
interest thereon from January 1, 1945, at the rate of six percent per annum until the date of
judgment.
1

~

~

'2. That said plaintiffs are further entitled to a judgment against the said defendants, Alan E.
Brockbank, Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation, for the sum of $
2,000.00 as damages to the land of the plaintiffs described in plaintiff's complaint by reason of the
destruction of plaintiff's ditch and the deprivation of their right-of-way described in plaintiff's
complaint, together with interest thereon at the rate of six percent per annum from January 1, 1945
to the date of judgment herein; provided, that if said Alan E. Brockbank, Gaylie Rich Brockbank
and Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation, shall within 90 days from the entry of judgment herein
shall repair and reconstruct said ditch and shall cause to be restored to said plaintiffs said right-ofway for said ditch to the said plaintiffs so that said plaintiffs can convey their water through said
ditch and over the said right-of-way for the irrigation of said lands owned by (112 Utah 85) the
plaintiffs and described in plaintiff's complaint, then the said defendants, Alan E. Brockbank,
Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal Homes, Inc., shall be entitled to the credited upon the amount
of said judgment the sum of$ 2,000.00.*****
'4. That the defendants other than Alan E. Brockbanks, Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal
Homes, Inc., a corporation, are entitled to the judgment of this court dismissing the plaintiffs
complaint as to them.'
From judgment and decree:

@

~

'1. That the plaintiffs, Thomas W. Adamson and Mina Adamson, do have and recover
judgment against the defendants, Alan E. Brockbank, Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal Homes,
Inc., a corporation, for the sum of $ 1202.84, together with interest thereon from January 1, 1945,
until the date of this judgment, amounting to$ 1289.01 .'
'2. That the said plaintiffs, Thomas W. Adamson and Mina Adamson, are further entitled to
judgment against the said defendants, Alan E. Brockbank, Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal
Homes, Inc., a corporation, for the sum of$ 2,000.00 as damages suffered by the plaintiffs by
reason of the destruction of plaintiff's ditch and by reason of being deprived of said ditch and rightDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of-way described in plaintiffs complaint, together with interest on said sum at the rate of six
percent per annum from January 1, 1945 until the date of this judgment, amounting to $ 2148.50.'
~

'It is provided, however, in this connection that if the said defendants Alan E. Brockbank,
Gaylie Rich Brockbank and Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation, shall within 90 days from the entry
hereof repair and reconstruct the said ditch and shall cause to be restored to said plaintiffs said
right-of-way for said ditch to the said plaintiffs so that plaintiffs can convey their water through said
ditch and over said right-of-way, then there shall be credited upon said judgment the sum of$
2,000.00. '*****

~

'4. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs do have and recover their
costs herein expended against the defendants, Alan E. Brockbank, Gaylie Rich Brockbank and
Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation.'
'5. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs complaint as to the First
Security Trust Company, a corporation, Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation; Bud Pate and Mrs.
Bud Pate, impleaded herein as Bud Tate and Mrs. Bud Tate; F. H. Durfee and Mrs. F. H. Durfee;
Ralph Garrett and Mrs. Ralph Garrett; Earl [112 Utah 86] Schow and Edith P. Schow, impleaded
herein as Mrs. Earl Schow; Melvin Williams and Theressa J. Williams, lmpleaded herein as Mrs.
Melvin Williams; Lee Kirby and Zelba Kirby, impleaded herein as Lee Kerby and Mrs. Lee Kerby;
Ray Curran and Gertrude Curran, impleaded herein as Mrs. Ray Curran; John L. Cyphers and
Mary Cyphers, impleaded herein as Jack Cyphers and Mrs. Jack Cyphers; Max Nielson and Leah
B. Nielson, impleaded herein as Mrs. Max Nielson; Amber Boulter and Ruth M. Boulter, impleaded
herein as Mrs. Amber Boulter, be and the same is hereby dismissed.' (Alf italics in the above
quoted matter are mine.)
Obviously the inclusion of Federal Homes, Inc., in Par. 5 of the judgment and decree was a
clerical error. That paragraph was intended to correspond with Par. No. 5 of the conclusions of
law, and when an analysis of the other quotations is made, it shows clearly why such was the
case.
The Federal Homes, Inc., was one of the defendants who moved for a new trial. If it thought
the action had been dismissed as against it, such a motion was indeed a strange way of
evidencing such a thought. The motion for new trial was denied May 17, 1946. On June 12, and
14, 1946, the plaintiffs (Adamsons) served and filed a notice of motion to strike from paragraph 5
of the decree the words 'Federal Homes, Inc., a corporation' on the grounds of inadvertence and
mistake and that it was a clerical error. On the 23d day of June, 1946, an 'Order Amending
Judgment' was entered correcting the error and directing 'that this order correcting the said
judgment and decree and the record thereof be entered nunc p·ro tune to appear on the record as
of the 29th day of March, 1946, that being the time date when said judgment and decree was
originally made and entered.' This order recites that it appears that this mistake was 'by reason of
inadvertance and clerical error.'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The appeal is from the judgment and decree as entered on the 29th of March, 1946, quoting in particular certain paragraphs -- and also an appeal is taken from 'the order and
~

judgment made and entered in the above entitled court and cause on the 23rd day of June 1946.'
[112 Utah 87] It seems rather obvious that the parties and the lower court have considered
this error as merely clerical up and until the motion for dismissal -- the defendants by their motion
for new trial, the plaintiffs by their motion to strike, and the lower court by the finding supporting the
motion to strike.
If just a clerical error, then its correction would not extent the time of appeal; if a substantial
error, it would be reasonable to hold that a motion to correct it would have the same effect as a

cJb}

motion for a new trial -- extend the time to appeal until it was ruled upon.
It seems obvious that the error is clerical. This shows upon the face of the record. No one
has been misled as to that fact.
Attention is invited to the following authorities: Cullen v. Harris et al., 27 Utah 4, 73 P. 1048;
Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952; Citizens' Nat. Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles v.
Holton, 210 Cal. 44, 290 P. 447, Sec. XV, 10 A.LR. 588, 67 A.LR. 842, and 126 A.LR. 977;

Amer.Juris., Vol. 30, Sec. 111, p. 877.
The appeal should be dismissed.

~
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FILED
MAY 31 2016
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
MILLARD COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

CAROL H. PETERSON, Trustee,
Plaintiff,

v.
CaseNo. 130700033
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

MARK A. PIERCE, et. al.,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on January 4-7, 2016, and again on
March 28, 2016. Plaintiff Carol H. Peterson ("Peterson") was represented by Lewis P. Reece.
Defendants Mark A. Pierce and Julie D. Pierce ("the Pierces") were represented by Dale B.

Kimsey. The Court directed the parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact, which were filed on
March 21 and 23, 2016.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
1. The properties at issue are adjacent properties and are located in Millard
County, state of Utah.
2. Plaintiff's parcel (hereinafter the ''Peterson Parcel") is more particularly
described as:
Parcel 1
The South half of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Filmore City Survey, less the
South 70 feet.
I
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Parcel 2
Beginning 10 rods South of the Northeast Comer of Lot 6, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence South 5 rods; thence West 13 1/3 rods; thence North
5 rods, thence East 13 1/3 rods to the point of beginning.
3. Plaintiff and its predecessor in title acquired the Peterson Parcel on July 23, 1997.

Exhibits P-16.
4. Defendants' first parcel (hereinafter ''Parcel 1") is more particularly described as:

Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City
Survey, thence West 194 feet; thence North 70 feet; thence east 194 feet, thence
South 70 feet to the point of beginning.
5. Defendants acquired Parcel 1 on June 12, 1989. Exhibit P-14
6. Defendants' second parcel (hereinafter "Parcel 2) is more particularly described as:

Beginning 194 feet West of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 139.5 feet; thence North 70 feet; thence East
139.S feet; thence South 70 feet to the point of beginning.

7. Defendants acquired Parcel 2 on May 22, 1997. Exhibits P-18, P-19
8. Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel were all owned under common ownership by
Harold H. Hatton and Flora Allie G. Hatton, co trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocable
Family Trust, dated February 9, 1983. Exhibits P-31, P-32. The parties further stipulated to the
~

fact of unity of title for Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel.
9. Harold H. Hatton and Flora Allie G. Hatton are the parents of Carol Hatton Peterson,

Plaintiff trustee.
10. Harold H. Hatton and Allie G. Hatton are the grandparents of Defendant Julie Pierce.
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11. Plaintiff Carol Hatton Peterson is the aunt of Defendant Julie Pierce.
12. There exists a two rutted lane next to the Peterson Parcel and within Parcel I, near the
northern boundary of the same as shown on Exhibit P-1 (hereinafter the Two Rutted Lane).

Exhibit P-1 is a 2014 aerial google photograph, but the testimony of all parties is that the
location of this two rutted lane as it passes through Parcel 1 is essentially the same as it has been
since the late 1930's. The parties dispute whether this Two Rutted Lane is the joint driveway
referenced in the Defendants' deeds. Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19.
13. Further, the parties stipulated that at the time of severance of Parcel 1, June 12, 1989,
use of the two rutted lane was open and apparent.

14. The Peterson home is located on the Peterson Parcel and is shown as the home in the
top portion of Exhibit P-1 ("Peterson Home"). This home was built in or about 1975 when
Harold Hatton retired from fanning and traded either his farm and/or his equipment to the
builder who built the home.
15. Defendants' home ("Pierce Home") is shown as the home on the bottom portion of

Exhibit P-1. This home has been located in its current location since approximately the late
1930's.
16. After Harold Hatton retired from farming, he rented out the Pierce Home until it was
sold to the Pierces in June, 1989. Consequently from about 1975 until June 12, 1989, the Two
Rutted Lane served as a joint drive way to the Peterson Home and the Pierce Home. During that
time, Defendants Mark and Julie Pierce rented the Pierce Home from about 1986 until they
purchased the Pierce Home on June 12, 1989.

3
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17. Harold and Allie Hatton lived in the Peterson Home until their deaths in 1996.
18. The testimony is disputed whether Harold Hatton continued to use the Two Rutted
Lane as a joint driveway after he retired from fanning and until his death in 1996. However, the
court is persuaded by the clear weight of the evidence that Harold Hatton continued using his
tractor to garden, clear off snow for neighbors, and for other purposes, that he drove his truck up
and down the Two Rutted Lane, and that he otherwise used the Two Rutted Lane as often as he
desired to access the back of his property (Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel), as
often as he needed or desired during that time.
19. This fact is further supported by the testimony of Mark & Julie Pierce wherein they
@

claim to have given Harold Hatton a license to use the Two Rutted Lane as often as he liked in
exchange for the first right of refusal to purchase Parcel 2. Exhibit p ...15.
20. In so finding, however, this court does not find that such a license existed as the Court
will later explain in its findings and conclusions.
21. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants could not consent to Harold Hatton's use
of the two rutted lane by way of a license because the court likewise fmds that Harold Hatton and
Defendants were not clear on the location of the boundary between the Peterson Parcel to the
north and Parcels I and 2 on the south.
22. Specifically, Defendant Mark Pierce testified that the boundary was by the telephone
pole to the east and at about to the southeast comer of the Starley fence on the west (Exhibit p...
2). Yet, on cross examination, it was clear that the west end of that boundary (or the Northwest
comer of Parcel 1) was roughly 25 to 30 feet away from the southeast comer of the Starley
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fence. The Court is persuaded by clear evidence that all parties considered the southeast comer
of Parcel I to be where the fence and the cement marker is, which is 4.5 feet south of where the

Gd

survey line is. The Court is further persuaded by the testimony of the witnesses, particularly
Betty Jo Durnell, that Harold Hatton and Lynn Hatton measured the 70 feet for the Parcel I from
the southeast comer of Parcel 1 using the fence line instead of the survey location. Consequently,
the testimony by Mark Pierce that the boundary was by the telephone pole is just as accurately
4.5 feet south of the telephone pole.
23. The Court is persuaded by clear evidence that neither Harold Hatton nor Defendants
knew where the survey line actually was for the boundary between the Peterson Parcel and
Parcels 1 and 2, and that this remained unknown until after Harold Hatton's death and until the
line was surveyed and subsequently marked in the fall of 1997. Consequently, use of the Two
Rutted Lane by Harold Hatton until the time of his death was by historical use and under claim
of right, not by a license.
24. When Harold & Allie Hatton as trustees conveyed Parcel 1 to Mark and
Julie Pierce on June 12, 1989, there was a need to convey an additional seven (7) feet by way of

~

an easement so that Parcel 1 could be subdivided from the main parcel. The Court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that all parties understood that this :frontage requirement was the
purpose of and reason for the seven foot easement north of Parcel 1 (the south seven feet of the
Peterson Parcel). The purpose was not for the joint driveway, and inclusion of the joint driveway
language in Exhibit P-14 in that seven feet easement was a scrivener's error.
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25. This finding is supported by, among other things, the plain language of Exhibit P-14
which expressly makes the conveyance of Parcel 1 subject to a joint driveway, and all parties
testified, including Defendant Marlc Pierce, that there was only one access way back into Parcel
2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel, which was the Two Rutted Lane that has been in

existence for roughly 70 years. The Court is not persuaded in the least that Harold or Allie
Hatton, as Trustees, ever intended to convey Parcel I to Defendants without expressly giving
themselves access to use the two rutted lane so they could access the remainder of their property
(Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel). The Court is simply not persuaded by
Defendants' license claim especially in view ofthe express grant of an easement for a joint
driveway in Exhibit P-14.
26. Further, when Mark Pierce spoke with the surveyor, he told the surveyor that the
purpose of the seven foot easement north of Parcel 1 was for frontage. Exhibit P-37, page 73,

74.
27. Moreover, Julie Pierce testified that the seven foot easement was never used as a
joint driveway and that the pmpose of the seven foot easement was for frontage, not for a joint
driveway. There was and has only been one joint driveway between the Peterson Home and the
Pierce Home, which is the Two Rutted Lane.
28. Keith Dalton testified that if the parties did not intend the seven feet as a joint
driveway, but for frontage only, and that the two rutted lane was the intended joint driveway,
then there was an error in the deed.
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29. Dale Robinson, the surveyor, further testified without rebuttal that typically legal
descriptions are inserted into deeds by someone other than the grantor, and that the grantor just
assumes that the legal description says what he intended it to say. Exhibit 37, page 55:2S-56:5.
30. The Court is persuaded by the historic use of the Two Rutted Lane, by the testimony
of the parties, by Hatton' s need to use the Two Rutted Lane to access Parcel 2 and the west side
of the Peterson Parcel, as well as other testimony introduced at trial and through the exhibits, that
there was a scrivener's error, that Harold and Allie Hatton, Trustees, intended the seven foot
easement solely for frontage, and that they believed they expressly reserved use of the Two
Rutted Lane in Exhibit P-14 as the joint driveway.
31. The Court is further persuaded that Marie and Julie Pierce were equally aware that the
south seven feet in the Peterson Parcel was for frontage purposes only and that the Two Rutted
Lane was to be kept and preserved as a joint driveway. Until the survey was performed and the
comers marked in the fall of 1997, Mark and Julie Pierce were unaware of the mistake in their
deed to Parcel 1.
32. With regard to the survey, following the death of Harold and Allie Hatton in 1996
(Allie Hatton died in late 1996), Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo Dunnell became the successor
trustees to the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust, dated, February 9, 1983 (hereinafter
the "Hatton Family Trust''). Because of previous family distrust and disputes, Lynn Hatton
requested that a survey be completed in connection with the sale of the Peterson Parcel to Larry
and Carol Peterson.

7
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33. That survey was not completed until July 8, 1997. This was after Parcel 2 was
conveyed to Marlc and Julie Pierce. Consequently, the court talces nothing by the fact that the
deeds for Parcel 2 reiterated the south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel as the joint driveway.
~

The Court fmds this was nothing but a perpetuation of the scrivener's error originating in the
deed to Parcel I.
Julie Pierce testified that the portion of the property that is identified in the deeds as the
"easement" was her grandfather's lawn, and she would not have driven on that property. This
testimony further supports the Court's findings that the Pierces did not believe that the joint
driveway was to be located anywhere other than the two rutted lane that had been used for
decades.
34. The survey bad been completed, however, when Larry and Carol Peterson took title

~

to the Peterson Parcel. There is a dispute in the evidence what was on the ground by way of
markers from the SutVey, when Larry and Carol Peterson purchased the Peterson Parcel. The
evidence is undisputed that the surveyor did not set the comers of the survey until the fall of

1997. Mark Pierce testified that the surveyor placed survey flags on the comers, but there was no
evidence that the flags were placed in such a way that an ordinary person without surveying
knowledge would understand the purpose of the flag's location. Mark Pierce testified that he met
with Larry Peterson near the telephone pole, that there was a flag there, and that he told Larry
that flag meant that was the boundary of the property. He stated, however, that Larry did not
@

agree with him that that was the property line.
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35. Nonetheless, the Court finds that when Larry and Carol Peterson purchased the
property, they were aware of the dispute over the boundary. Exhibit p..21. The Court specifically
finds by clear evidence that both Larry and Carol Peterson as well as their Grantors, Trustees of
the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was the joint driveway referenced
in the Pierces' deeds. Further, the Peterson deed expressly included easements, rights of way and
appurtenances. Exhibit P-16. Given that language and the language in the Pierce deeds,

(Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19), that expressly makes Pierces title subject to a joint driveway, and
given that there has never been but one lane used as a joint driveway between the Peterson Home
and the Pierce Home, the Court finds by clear evidence that Larry and Carol Peterson took title
with the full expectation and reliance that they would have access to the west of their property
through the Two Rutted Lane.
36. Moreover, the Court finds that Larry and Carol Peterson did in fact use the Two
Rutted Lane as a joint driveway as often as they needed. The testimony was clear and convincing
that Larry Peterson mowed the grass strip between the two rutted lanes weekly from the time he
purchased the property until shortly before his death or that he had others mow the strip on his
behalf when he was unable to do so. Mark Pierce testified that he did not see Larry Peterson do
this, but he also admitted that he worked from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. Mondays through
Fridays since before the Petersons purchased the Peterson Parcel to the present time. His
testimony did not effectively rebut the clear testimony from Carol Peterson and others that Larry
and Carol Peterson thought the joint driveway was theirs equally with the Pierces, and that they
used the Two Rutted Lane and cared for it like it was their own property.
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37. At the time of the conveyance of Parcel 2, Betty Jo Dunnell, the only surviving CoTrustee of the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was going to be used
by both property owners as a joint driveway.
@

38. Betty Jo Dunnell always understood the phrase "joint driveway" to mean that both

owners had access to the driveway, as that is how it had always been. At the time of this
conveyance to Defendants, Betty Jo Dunnell, as co-trustee of the Hatton Family Trust, did not
0j

have any understanding that the Trust was conveying away the Two Rutted Lane or the joint
driveway. That was not her intent. Indeed, her intent was that she was conveying access to the
joint driveway which had always been the Two Rutted Lane. The Court is persuaded by this
testimony.
39. After the Pierces acquired Parcels 1 and 2 and after Petersons acquired their parcel,

@

the Pierces had the surveyor mark the survey comers. This was in the fall of 1997, roughly eight
years after the Pierces acquired Parcel 1. See Exhibits P-8, P-22. This was after all the
conveyances at issue. Exhibits P-14, P-16, P-18 and P-19. Prior to this time, the property line
between Parcels 1 & 2 and the Peterson Parcel was not surveyed and marked and the Court finds
there was some confusion between the parties as to the precise location of the property line.
40. Every fence surrounding the original Hatton Family Trust parcel (Parcel 1,
Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel) is several feet off from the survey line. Exhibit P-2.
41. Many speculate on what Harold Hatton said about the joint driveway, but the only
document signed by Harold Hatton plainly states that the Pierces' receipt of Parcel 1 was
"subject to" the joint driveway. See Exhibit P-14. The deeds to both Parcels 1 and Parcel 2
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clearly make the conveyance to the Pierces "subject to" the joint driveway. See Exhibits P-14,

P-18 & P-19. This "subject to" language would have been entirely unnecessary if the parties to

~

those deeds had understood the location of the property line and that the joint driveway was the
south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel as the Pierces now argue. But that is not what happened
and the Court finds by clear evidence that that is not what the parties intended, either the Hattons
and the Pierces as to Parcel 1, or the successor trustees and the Pierces as to Parcel 2.
42. Larry and Carol Peterson's offer to purchase the property from the Hatton Family

(i;;

Trost is also instructive. The offer is for the purchase of four parcels of property and
demonstrates that all parties understood the joint driveway was partly on the Pierce property and

partly on what was eventually the Peterson Parcel. The first parcel identified for purchase is the
Peterson Parcel. Compare Exhibit P-16 with Exhibit P-24, Parcel A. The second parcel
identified is the joint driveway between Parcels 1 and the Peterson Parcel. Exhibit P-24, Parcel
B. The third parcel identified for purchase is Parcel 2. Compare Exhibit P-24, Parcel C with

Exhibit P-18. Parcel 2 was sold to the Pierces because they exercised their right of first refusal.
The fourth parcel identified for purchase was the joint driveway between Parcels 2 and the
Peterson Property. Exhibit P-24, Parcel D. Exhibit P-24 was signed by both the Hatton Family
Trust and the Petersons. /d. It is not logical for the Petersons and the Hatton Family Trust to
agree to sell the Peterson Parcel and the joint driveway {Exhibit P-24, .Parcels A and B) if the
Parties understood the joint driveway were entirely on the Peterson Parcel as the survey later
showed unless at the time, they were operating under the misunderstanding that the joint
driveway was partly on Parcel 1 or the Pierce property. The Court finds that the parties indeed
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were operating under a mutually mistaken belief that the joint driveway was partially on both the
Peterson Parcel and Parcel I.
43. Moreover, the easement referenced in Exhibit P-24, Parcel Bis identified as "an

established easement providing mutual ingress and egress for the adjacent properties [common
driveway] and was established by the Trust on June 12, 1989." Id. The only "established"
common driveway between the Peterson Parcel and Parcel I that was actually used as a common
driveway was the Two Rutted Lane. The Pierces admit that the seven feet immediately north of
Parcel 1 has never been used as a joint driveway. Julie Pierce Dep. at 25:9-16, and 25:19-26:14.
Consequently, the only joint driveway that was "established" and "providing mutual ingress and

egress" to the properties at the time of the 1997 offer was the Two Rutted Lane plainly shown on
Exhibit P-1.
44. After the conveyance to the Pierces, Mr. Hatton continued to use the driveway

without incident until his death.

45. The Pierces were aware of Mr. Hatton's regular use of the driveway.
46. After Mr. Hatton died and the Peterson Property was conveyed to Larry and
Carol Peterson, Larry and Carol Peterson also used the driveway on a regular basis to gain access
to the back of the Peterson Property without asking pennission of the Pierces. The clear
testimony is that they used it as often as they needed, including weekly to mow the grass and
otherwise maintain the Two Rutted Lane.

12
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47. The Petersons used the shed in the back portion of their property to store tools and

GiJ

equipment.
48. David Peterson, the son of Larry and Carol Peterson, would frequently come to visit
his parents and help out around the house. He would routinely take the truck to the back of the
Peterson Property using the Two Rutted Lane between the Pierce Property and the Peterson
Property. Since Larry Peterson's passing, David Peterson maintained the strip of lawn until the
Pierces installed the fence on the north edge of the driveway.
49. David Peterson would not ask the Pierces for permission to use the driveway on such
occasions.
50. After Larry Peterson's death, Mr. Pierce became confrontational about the Petersons'
use of the driveway, demanding that they request permission or attempting to deny access.
While the testimony also established that Mark Pierce made attempts to prevent the
Petersons from using the driveway, the Court is not persuaded that such attempts were

sufficiently successful to deprive the Petersons from such use.
51. The Petersons were able to access the back of the Peterson Property by using the Two
Rutted Lane until the Pierces constructed a fence on the north edge of their property in July
2013. The fence essentially prevents the Petersons' use of the Two Rutted Lane altogether and
leaves the Petersons without reasonable access to their property. This lawsuit was initiated
shortly thereafter.
52. Without the use of the Two Rutted Lane, the Petersons cannot access the back portion
of their property with a vehicle absent great difficulty.
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53. There is no reasonable access point on the north side of the Peterson Home.
54. The Petersons have a garden in the back of their property. They have sheds on the
back of their property. They have fruit trees on the back of their property. Their use of the Two
Rutted Lane is not a daily requirement. However, on occasion, they need to use the Two Rutted
Lane to service the garden, access their sheds, trim trees and bushes, etc. The Court finds that a
reasonable use should be allowed.
55. This Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Two
Rutted Lane is the joint driveway as referenced in the relevant deeds and recorded documents.

Exhibits 14, 15, 18 and 19. The clear weight of the historical evidence and photographs
demonstrate that the Hattons intended to reserve to themselves and their successors in title use of
the Two Rutted Lane as a joint driveway. See e.g., Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, & 25. Specifically
with respect to Exhibit 14, the Court finds that the "subject to and together with a joint
driveway'' language was a clear attempt by Harold Hatton and Allie Hatton, trustees, to reserve a
right of way over Parcel 1 for use of the Two Rutted Lane. The legal description following the
@

joint driveway language in Exhibit 14 was in obvious error. As Julie Pierce, a party to Exhibit
14 testified, the parties intended the easement for seven feet north of Parcel 1 as additional
frontage so they could sever Parcel 1 from the entire Hatton property. She testified that that

~

seven feet was not intended to be used as a joint driveway, but that the joint driveway was the
Two Rutted Lane. Further, neither Pierces nor the Hattons nor the Petersons ever used the seven
feet north of Pierce's property as a joint driveway. Petersons used the Two Rutted Lane as
though in fact it was the joint driveway to which they had an express easement under the terms

14
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of their deed. Exhibit 16. With the conveyance to their family trust, Petersons' use of the Two
Rutted Lane did not materially change.
56. After this lawsuit commenced, in an effort to rebut the legal presumption of adverse

use when the use is in excess of 20 years, Defendants now claim that they allowed Harold Hatton
to use the joint driveway by way of a license. They claim they granted Harold Hatton a license to
use the driveway during his lifetime in exchange for the agreement for a right of first refusal to

purchase Parcel 2. They claim that right of first refusal was given to Defendants at the time
Parcel 1 was conveyed to them. Exhibit P-15. Nowhere in Exhibit P-15, however, is there even
a hint of this license. This is odd, especially if the first right of refusal was given in exchange for
the license. The lack of any evidence whatsoever supporting a license in the right of first refusal
Agreement, is itself evidence that no such license existed. See e.g., Utah R. Evid. 803(7) and
803(10); see also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (''No estate or interest in real property ... shall be ..

. declared othezwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party ... declaring the same.").
57. Furthermore, based upon the evidence presented regarding Harold Hatton and his

character, the Court does not find it credible that Harold would rely solely on an oral license
from the Pierces to maintain his right to access the back portion of his property.
58. The fence along the south boundary line of the Pierce Property is 4.5 feet farther

south than the south boundary line described in the deeds as surveyed. In other words, the south
east comer of Parcel 1, which is the beginning point for the legal description of both Parcel 1 and

Parcel 2, is off 4 ½ feet south, with the practical result being that the joint driveway is
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approximately half on the Parcels 1 and 2 and half on the Peterson Parcel. Exhibits P-2, p..7, P11.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

REFORMATION OF DEED BASED ON MUTUAL MISTAKE
1. Refonnation is appropriate "where the tenns of the written instrument are mistaken in

@

that they do not show the true intent of the agreement between the parties. There are two grounds
for reformation of such an agreement: mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or mistake by
one party, coupled with fraud by the other party." RHN Corp. v. Veibell. 2004 UT 60, ,r 36, 96
P.3d 935 (quoting Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984)). "A mutual mistake
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain." Robert Langson v. McQuarrie,
741 P.2d 554,551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). ''Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error in
reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to writing." Naisbitt v. Hodges, 307 P.2d 620,

@

623 (Utah 1957). "Parol evidence is admissible to show the writing did not conform to the intent
of the parties." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Once a mutual
mistake has been shown, ''the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration'' in
reforming the deed. Id The moving party has ''the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a mutual mistake of fact." See Hatch v. Bastian, 561 P .2d 1100, 1102
(Utah 1977).
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2. Evidence of mutual mistake is abundant. The legal description in the deeds does not
match the actual boundaries of the rutted lane or joint driveway as it was used prior to and at the
time of conveyance. Furthermore, although the language in the deeds say that Defendants' land
is "subject to" a joint driveway, Defendants argue that there is no such easement on their
property but that the easement is actually on Plaintiff's property, thereby creating ambiguity in
the conveyances and strengthening the claim for mutual mistake. In addition, the 4.5 feet
discrepancy on the southern border of Parcel 1 per the 1997 survey also supports the claim of
mutual mistake. And finally, the evidence that the actual easement described in the deeds (on the
Peterson Parcel) was never used by the parties as a joint driveway, creates further ambiguity in
support of the mutual mistake by the parties. In contrast, the existence of the joint driveway or
rutted lane, in essentially the same spot for over 50 years and used by both predecessor and the
parties, shows that when the parties to the deeds said 'joint driveway" in the deeds, they clearly
referred to the Two Rutted Lane they were using.
3. In McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333,249 P.2d 502 (1952), the defendant argued that
if any mistake were made in the conveyance, it was not a mutual mistake and therefore not a
basis for reformation. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's finding
of mutual mistake, holding that "[t]he fallacy of the argument relative to lack of mutuality is
readily seen by putting the shoe on the other foot." Id. at 506. A court may consider extrinsic
evidence, not for the purpose of divining contractual intent of the parties (thereby first requiring
a finding of ambiguity), "but rather to show the existence of mutual mistake." Robert Langston v.

McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Here, since Hatton is deceased, the Court
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must look to extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of the mutual mistake, which evidence
abounds.
4. Plaintiff seeks to reform Exhibits 14, 18 and 19 such that "joint driveway'' description
is no longer confused with the seven foot frontage easement north of Defendant's property.
Notwithstanding Mark Pierce's testimony that he knew where the north boundary of his property
was and that the joint driveway was along the grass on the south seven feet of Plaintiffs
property, which testimony the Court finds is not credible, the clear weight of the evidence,
including the affirmative testimony of Julie Pierce at trial, is that the Hattons and the Pierces
believed that the joint driveway as described in Exhibit 14 was the Two Rutted Lane. This
mistake was mutual with both Hattons and the Pierces, and it was repeated in Exhibits 18 and

19.

5. Defendants claim that Plaintiff's right to reform the deeds is time barred or barred by
the doctrines of laches. It is true that Plaintiff or her predecessor could have brought a claim to
reform the deed after discovering the survey line between the Peterson Parcel and Parcels 1 and
2. Plaintiff's predecessor, Larry Peterson, however, clearly claimed that he had an absolute right

to use the joint driveway as though it belonged to both Petersons and Pierces. See Exhibit 21.
Given that Petersons continued to use the Two Rutted Lane as though they had an absolute right
to use the same and given that Defendants did not block that right in any permanent or real way

until they put up the fence in the summer of 2013, the Court finds that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the summer of 2013. For that same reason, the Plaintiff's claim is not
barred by the doctrine of laches.
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6. Consequently, the Court hereby directs that Exhibits 14, 18 and 19 be reformed to
clarify that the joint driveway is not the seven foot strip north of Defendants' property. Rather, it
is the Two Rutted Lane.
II.

WIDTH OF THE JOINT DRIVEWAY
7. The Court further directs that the Two Rutted Lane be surveyed, that the center be

located, and that Plaintiff's and her successor's right to use the Two Rutted Lane should be five
feet on each side of the center line for a total often feet, which is a reasonable width as testified
by Mr. Dale Robinson. D. Robinson Depo. 56:9-15. It is also a width that is consistent with the
historical use of the joint driveway, where it has been used to haul hay and other machinery. In
the alternative, the Court reserves this issue of the width of the Two Rutted Lane for further
hearing and testimony.

III.

EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY
8. Regarding easement by implication, the clear weight of the evidence must support each

of the elements necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (1) that unity of title was
followed by severance; (2) that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of
severance; (3) that the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant
estate; and (4) that the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. Ovard v.
Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1979); Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244,494 P.2d 950,

952 (1972); Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320,323 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
9. Each element for easement by implication is met in this case by the clear weight of the
evidence. First, as for unity of title followed by severance, Defendants' predecessors, the
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Hattons, conveyed their property into trust prior to any of the conveyances at issue. Parcels I and
2 and the Peterson Parcel were all owned by the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust,
dated, February 9, 1983, when the Pierces received Parcel 1 and then later Parcel 2. See Exhibits
31 & 32, and compare, Exhibits 14, 18 & 19. Further, Defendants stipulated to unity of title at

the outset of trial.
10. Second, Defendants stipulated that the use of the Two Rutted Lane was open and
@

apparent at the time of severance. Whether Defendants intended that this stipulation included the
severance of Parcel 2 in 1997 is immaterial. As stated above, the Court finds that that use was
open and apparent in Parcel 2 because at the time of severance in 1997, the Two Rutted Lane
was clearly visible and Defendant Julie Pierce had not directed that dirt be spread over the Two
Rutted Lane the area in front of the manger as she testified at trial. See testimony of James
Brunson, Betty Jo Dunne!, David Peterson, Carol Peterson, and Julie Pierce who testified that
she had dirt spread over the two ruts on the northwestern boundary of Parcel 1 and into Parcel 2,
in front of the manger. See Exhibit 1. As to photographic evidence, see Exibits 1, 4, 8, 9, and

22. Use of the Two Rutted Lane or joint driveway was apparent at the time of severance for both
Parcel l and Parcel 2. Further, Mark Pierce testified that he used the Two Rutted Lane and only
the Two Rutted Lane to access the back of his property, including the back of Parcel 1, with
vehicles and equipment when he needed.
11. Thir~ the Court finds that use of the Two Rutted Lane is reasonably necessary for
enjoyment of the Peterson Parcel. Much of the time at trial was spent on this issue, and
unnecessarily so. The law does not require absolute necessity, only a reasonable necessity.
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Consequently, the Court need not find that Plaintiff cannot access the west of her property absent
the Two Rutted Lane. Rather, the Court need only find by clear evidence that access absent the
Two Rutted Lane is unreasonably difficult The Court so finds. The location of the telephone
pole, the tree stump, the irrigation lines and valves on the south side of the Peterson Home, gas
meter and lines which go directly south of the meter and then tum east down the Two Rutted
Lane, the cemented irrigation risers on the back lawn of the Peterson Home and the just over
seven feet clearance between the apple tree near the manger and the new fence placed by
Defendants, as well as the difficulty in driving a truck down that south side of the Peterson
Parcel, all lead the Court to conclude that access down that south side of the Peterson Parcel is
unreasonably difficult. See also Exhibits 9, 10, 13, 23, 36, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 115,

117, 118, & 119 and the testimony offered at trial. It is not reasonably necessary that Plaintiff
drive over her front lawn to access the west portion of her property.
12. Likewise, it is not reasonable that Plaintiff take out the wall, add fill, and remove
trees to access the west portion of her property from the north. See Exhibits 1, & 6 and the
testimony offered at trial.
13. Finally, the Court finds that Peterson's use of the Two Rutted Lane in both Parcels

1 and 2 was continuous. Petersons maintained the center strip of grass between the two ruts by

mowing it weekly. They used the Two Rutted Lane to access their sheds, garden, fruit trees and
otherwise to use and enjoy the west portion of their property. Defendants' parking of vehicles on
the Two Rutted Lane was sporadic and did not interfere with the continuous nature of Plaintiff's
use.
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14. Consequently, this Court finds that the Petersons have an easement by implication of
reasonable necessity where the Two Rutted Lane is located and the right to use the Two Rutted
Lane as often as they so choose. Further, in the alternative, given the Court's findings of mutual
mistake and order for reformation of the deeds, Plaintiffs claim for easement by implication is
moot.
15. The Court does not reach a conclusion as to Plaintiff's other causes of action because
(i/J

the decision on the easement by implication and mutual mistake are dispositive.
IV.

ADVERSE POSSESSION
16. Defendants claim they have adversely possessed the Two Rutted Lane on their

property. Application of adverse possession law in this manner is erroneous. Adverse possession
involves the following: one must hold and possess the property "adversely to the legal title"
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-2-208(2). Here, Defendants cannot be adverse because
Defendants are not adverse to the legal title. They own Parcels 1 and 2 over which the claimed
joint driveway exists as discovered in the 1997 survey. Defendant's payment of property taxes
and use of their property by itself does not defeat Plaintiff's claims for easements across
Defendants' property. The issue is one of control of the property where the easement is located.
As the Court has found above, Defendants have not been in exclusive control of the Two Rutted

Lane. Therefore, Defendants claim for adverse possession is denied.
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V.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RELEASE LIS PENDENS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT

17. Following the filing of Plaintiffs complaint claiming prescriptive easements and
easements by implication, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens on Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. The controlling
statute states: "Either party to an action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property may file a notice of the pendency of the action .... '' Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1303.
Defendants sought to have the lis pendens released. "A court shall order a notice released if ..
.the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the
probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-1304(2) (emphasis added). Defendants contend that the lis pendens was improper and
should be released and they filed a motion for removal of the lis pendens and requested fees.
The recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons that any right or
interest they may acquire in the interim are subject to the judgment or decree.
One who acquires an interest in land that is the subject of pending litigation stands
in no better position than the person he acquires it from, he is charged with notice
of the claimed contrary rights of others, and he is bound by the judgment rendered
in the litigation.

Bagall v. Suburbia Land Co., 519 P.2d 914,916 (Utah 1978). The lis pendens in this case
justifiably served as notice to the world that any purchaser would acquire the property subject to
Plaintiff's claims for easement and reformation of deed.
18. Given the Court's findings above on the easement by implication and mutual mistake
based upon clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff's lis pendens was
properly filed
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19. Both parties request an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-1304(6), which provides in part: "A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a

prevailing party ... unless the court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial
justification; or (b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust."
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs, insofar as those attorney's fees
and costs were incurred to defend against Defendant's Motion to Remove the Lis Pendens, and
establish Plaintiff's claim for an easement and mutual mistake. Plaintiff's attorney's fees and
costs incurred, therefore, before Defendants filed their September 5, 2014 Motion to Remove Lis
Pendens, are not recoverable. Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred since that time,
~

however, are recoverable. Plaintiff's attorney is directed to submit an affidavit of attorney's fees
and costs consistent with the rules, allowing Defendants to review and otherwise object to the
same before submitting them to the Court. If there is an objection, the Court may set the matter
for further hearing and issue a final decision.
ORDER

Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare a Judgment and Decree consistent with the
foregoing that can be recorded with the Millard County Recorder.
DATED this

3 li:it day of May, 2016.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL H. PETERSON, TRUSTEE OF THE
LARRY A. AND CAROL H. PETERSON
FAMILY TRUST, uad, February 7, 2003,
Plaintiff,

~

.JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Civil No. 130700033
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

V.

MARK A. PIERCE; JULIE D. PIERCE, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on January 4, 5, 6, 7, 2016, and March 28, 2016, for
trial and hearing on Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Defendant's Counterclaim, and
Defendants' Motion to Release Lis Pendens and Request for Fees; and the Court having made and
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 31, 2016; and based upon the
GlliJ

same and otherwise finding good cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

I. The Warranty Deed recorded June 13, 1989, as Entry No. 73528, Book 227, Page
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632 with the Millard County Recorder, state of Utah, is hereby modified and
reformed in part as follows:
~

The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a joint
driveway over and across the following described property: Beginning 70
feet North of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 194 feet; thence South 7
feet; thence East 194 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Grantors and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 194 feet along the north
boundary of the property; thence South IO feet; thence East 194 feet to the
point of beginning.

2. The unrecorded Special Warranty Deed, executed by Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo
Dunnell, co-trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust dated
February 9, 1983, as Grantors, and Mark A. Pierce and Julie D. Pierce, as
Grantees, signed by Grantors on May 19, 1997, is hereby modified and reformed
in part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,

Judgment and Decree
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Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 136 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East I36 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Grantors and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
l 94 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North IO feet; thence West 136
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South IO feet; thence
East 136 feet to the point of beginning.

3. The Quitclaim Deed recorded June 6, 1997 as Entry No.00117369, Book 00316,
Pages 00462-00463 in the Millard County Recorder's Office, is hereby modified
and reformed in part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 139.5 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Grantors and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
194 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North IO feet; thence West 139.5
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence
East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.

Judgment and Decree
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4. Carol H. Peterson, trustee of the Larry A. and Carol H. Peterson Family Trust, uad,
February 7, 2003, and her successors and assigns are further granted an easement
for ingress and egress by way of implication of reasonable necessity over the
following described property located in Millard County, state of Utah, more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City
Survey, thence North IO feet; thence West 219.37 feet along the north boundary of the
property; thence South 10 feet; thence East 219.37 feet to the point of beginning.

5.

Plaintiff and her successors-in-interest have the right to use the "Joint Driveway"
described in paragraphs l, 2 and 3 above and the easement described in paragraph
4 above as often as Plaintiff and her successors may choose. Defendants, and each
of them, and all those acting in concert with them and Defendants' successors and
all those acting in concert with them are hereby forever enjoined from obstructing
Plaintiff and her successors' access to and use of the aforementioned Joint
Driveway and easement in any way whatsoever.

6. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-6-1304(8), Plaintiff is awarded her attorney
fees and costs as the prevailing party in defending against Defendants' Motion to
Remove the Lis Pendens and establishing her right to file and to maintain
recordation of her lis pendens based upon her legal theories presented at trial,
which was held concurrently with the hearing on Defendants' Motion, incurred
between September 5, 2014 (when Defendants filed their Motion to Remove the
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Lis Pendens) and March 28, 2016 (the last day of trial).
7. Having received and reviewed the affidavit of attorney's fees and costs submitted
~

by Plaintiffs counsel, and finding good cause, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants
Mark Pierce and Julie Pierce and each of them, jointly and severally, in the amount
of$115,378.25 in attorney's fees and $4,448.74 in Costs, for a total judgment of
$119,826.99, plus interest thereon at the statutory rate of2.65% per annum until
the judgment is paid in full.
8. Defendants' claims for trespass, quiet title, injunctive relief, adverse possession, no
privity, failure to state a claim, no mutual mistake, and no implication of necessity
are dismissed with prejudice. With regard to the Defendants' laches defense, the
Court has previously found that the deeds to Defendants were ambiguous given the
"subject to" language and the location of the joint driveway as described in the
deeds. There would be no reason for Defendants to take title "subject to" a joint
driveway if the joint driveway were actually located on Plaintiff's property and not
on Defendants' property. That ambiguity or defect in the deed is perpetual unless
corrected. The Court has inherent equitable powers to clarify and correct an
ambiguous deed and avoid a perpetual mistake continuing of record. Neither party
can benefit by sitting on their hands to the detriment of the other party when the
deeds themselves are ambiguous. Moreover, not until July, 2013, did Defendants
truly block Plaintiffs use of the two rutted lane. Consequently, this Court denies
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